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Statement Showing the Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court: 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law." 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review: 
Issue One: Whether the district court erred in permitting an attorney who was 
suspended for intentionally and/or knowingly engaging in professional misconduct 
involving dishonesty, to petition to stay a portion of the suspension and instead submit to 
a period of probation. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional 
misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah 
Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of 
discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). This 
issue arose for the first time in the trial court's Ruling and Order re: Sanctions. (R. 245-
258) 
Issue Two: Whether the district court erred in permitting an attorney who was 
suspended for intentionally and/or knowingly engaging in professional misconduct 
involving dishonesty and there were substantial aggravating factors and no mitigating 
factors, to petition to stay a portion of the suspension and instead submit to a period of 
probation. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in 
attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the 
evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue arose for 
the first time in the trial court's Ruling and Order re: Sanctions. (R. 245-258) 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules 
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. 
The Course of Proceedings: The case originated in a disciplinary action against 
J . Keith Henderson. (R. 1-12) On December 13, 2005, the court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment against Henderson as to his 
1 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 191-194) The District Court entered 
its Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions on February 6, 2006. (R. 245-258) Pursuant to Rule 
52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the OPC filed a Motion to Amend Ruling and 
Order re: Sanctions on February 21, 2006. (R. 260-261) The court entered an Order 
Amending Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions on April 17, 2006. (290-292) This appeal 
4 
ensued. (R. 294-295) This case was consolidated with In re Crawley. 
? 
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Disposition in the Trial Court: The trial court suspended Henderson for a period 
of twelve months, with leave to petition the court to stay all but three months of the 
suspension upon certain conditions. (R. 258) The order amending the ruling changed 
the provision of the RLDD pursuant to which Henderson must apply for reinstatement, 
clarified that the suspension period would be one year, whether or not a portion of the 
actual suspension is stayed, and ordered Henderson to comply with Rule 26(b) of the 
RLDD with respect to winding up his practice. (R. 291) 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
In September 1994, [William] Blakley was involved in an on-the-job accident 
when the truck he was driving overturned. (R. 192) Blakley retained Henderson to 
pursue unpaid worker's compensation claims Blakley had filed with the worker's 
compensation insurance carrier, American Insurance Company ("American Insurance"). 
(R. 192) 
Henderson knew that Blakley was pursuing a personal injury claim against the 
other driver in the accident, but did not inform Blakley that a settlement in the personal 
injury case could affect his worker's compensation claim. (R. 192) Around January 
2000, Blakley's personal injury attorney settled the personal injury claim against the 
third-party defendant in the accident. (R. 192) 
Without determining the status of Blakely's personal injury case, in early 
February 2000, Henderson filed an Application for Hearing requesting a hearing before 
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the Labor Commission for the State of Utah ("Labor Commission") regarding Blakley's 
unpaid worker's compensation claims. (R. 192) 
In mid-March 2000, American Insurance filed an Amended Response to 
Application for Hearing asserting a counterclaim for reimbursement for past payments 
and offset of future payments to Blakley because he had received settlement proceeds 
from the defendant in his personal injury case. (R. 192-193) 
The Labor Commission set a June 2, 2000 hearing on Blakley's worker's 
compensation claim. (R. 193) Before the date of the hearing, Henderson did not give 
Blakley a copy of American Insurance's response or its amended response. (R. 193) 
Henderson met with Blakley just prior to the hearing and as they traveled to it. (R. 193) 
Before and after the hearing, Henderson did not fully explain to Blakley how the 
settlement in his personal injury case would affect his pending and future worker's 
compensation claims. (R. 193) 
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") continued the Labor Commission hearing 
without date to see if the parties could reach a settlement regarding the amount of 
compensation that American Insurance would receive. (R. 193) 
After the June Labor Commission hearing, Blakley did not hear again from 
Henderson until he received a letter from Henderson dated November 30, 2000, which 
told him for the first time that American Insurance had a right to the third-party personal 
injury settlement and Blakley was not entitled to recover a worker's compensation 
award. (R. 193) 
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On November 9, 2000, Henderson had been suspended from the practice of law 
for two years, with all but six months stayed. (R. 194) Henderson failed to notify 
Blakley that Henderson had been suspended and could no longer represent Blakley. 
(R. 194) Henderson also failed to inform Blakley of the need to retain new counsel or 
represent himself pro se in the matter. (R. 194) Nor did Henderson provide Blakley 
with a copy of Blakley's file. (R. 194) Additionally, Henderson failed to notify Blakley 
that the next hearing in his case was set for February 27, 2001 and that Blakley should 
attend it. (R. 194) 
On February 27, 2001, the ALJ conducted a status conference hearing in 
Blakley's case. (R. 194) When Henderson failed to appear for the hearing, the ALJ 
telephoned him. (R. 194) During the telephone conversation, Henderson informed the 
ALJ that he had withdrawn from the case because it had settled. (R. 194) As of that 
date, however, Blakley had not reached a settlement with American Insurance. (R. 
194) The ALJ directed Henderson to file a withdrawal of counsel within ten days so the 
case could move forward. (R. 194) Henderson did not submit his withdrawal of 
counsel until October 15, 2002—more than eighteen months later. (R. 195) 
Based upon these facts, the District Court in the case underlying this appeal 
found and concluded that Henderson violated Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.4 
(Communication), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a) (Candor to 
the Tribunal), and 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct as 
alleged in the OPC's Complaint. (R. 194) 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The disciplinary matter against Henderson proceeded to a sanctions hearing on 
January 30, 2006. (R. 245) Each side briefed their positions in advance. (R. 199-226; R. 
230-240) The District Court received testimony and exhibits, and on February 6, 2006, 
entered its Ruling and Order re: Sanctions ("Ruling"). (R. 245) The court subsequently 
entered an Order Amending Ruling and Order re: Sanctions that clarified portions of the 
order in respects not germane to this appeal. (R. 290-292) 
The Ruling stated a number of findings and conclusions, summarized as follows. 
Henderson "violated numerous duties to his client, the Court and legal system, the public, 
and to the profession," and specified the respects in which Henderson violated each of 
these duties. (R. 246-247) Henderson's mental state was intentional with respect to his 
violation of the rule requiring candor towards tribunals. (R. 248) Henderson acted 
"intentionally, or at least knowingly, when he failed to comply with the tribunal's order to 
file a Withdrawal of Counsel." (R. 248) Henderson's failures of diligence and 
communication were knowing. (R. 249) Finally, Henderson caused potential harm to his 
client, and actual harm to the court and the legal system, and at least potential harm to 
the profession and the legal system. (R. 249-250) 
Based upon the foregoing, the District Court determined that Henderson's 
misconduct—his failure to notify Blakley that he had been suspended; his failure to notify 
Blakley of a pending hearing; his failure to return the file at the termination of the 
representation; his withdrawal nearly 20 months after being directed to do so; his failure 
to comply with the previous suspension order despite filing an affidavit indicating he had 
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done so; his misrepresentation to a tribunal; and his failure to inform the court of his 
suspension—called for suspension as a presumptive sanction pursuant to Rule 4.3(a) of 
the Standards. (R. 250-251) 
The Ruling also identified six aggravating factors. (R. 251-254) Henderson has a 
record of professional discipline: other discipline in 1988 and 1997, and a suspension in 
2000 for similar rule violations including "failing to provide competent representation, 
failing to communicate with clients, missing a court hearing and filing a false Affidavit." 
(R. 251) Henderson committed multiple offenses. (R. 252) Henderson obstructed the 
disciplinary proceedings by filing a late Answer, delaying in filing a discovery plan, failing 
to provide initial disclosures, and failing to respond in a timely fashion to discovery 
requests. (R. 252-253) Henderson failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
misconduct, arguing instead that he did nothing wrong. (R. 253) Henderson had 
substantial experience in the practice of law, having been admitted in April 1970. (R. 253) 
Henderson failed to make a good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his 
misconduct. (R. 254) 
The Ruling noted, but did not make an explicit determination concerning the OPC's 
argument that Henderson's actions demonstrated a dishonest or selfish motive. (R. 252-
253) The portion of the Ruling rejecting Henderson's argument that nothing in the record 
established his dishonesty or selfishness, however, noted that Henderson lied to the 
tribunal and deceived his client, the tribunal, and opposing attorney by omitting the fact of 
7 
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his suspension. These actions are both dishonest and selfish." (R. 255) The court thus 
rejected as a possible mitigating factor the absence of bad motive. (R. 255) 
Similarly, the Ruling noted that Henderson presented evidence of good character, 
but also the OPC's challenge of this evidence through a witness who reported Henderson 
because of his actions. (R. 255) Elsewhere, it stated that "there is no evidence before 
the Court to mitigate the presumptive sanction." (R. 255) 
After weighing these aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court 
determined that "there is no basis for a lesser sanction than the suspension presumed by 
the Standards." (R. 255) In addressing Henderson's argument that he should receive a 
public reprimand, rather than a suspension, the Ruling stated "The fact that his previous 
suspension was for similar actions leads the Court to believe he has not learned from the 
minimum suspension." (R. 255) 
The District Court suspended Henderson for twelve months, but granted him leave 
to petition the court to stay all but three months of it upon specific conditions involving 
submitting his practice to supervision. (R. 256) If Henderson does not petition for a stay, 
he must serve the entire suspension. (R. 256-257) To date, Henderson has not 
petitioned the District Court to have his suspension stayed for a period of supervised 
probation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the OPC's view, probation is not an appropriate sanction when an attorney 
knowingly, or knowingly and intentionally, engaged in professional misconduct involving 
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dishonesty, particularly when there were significant aggravating factors including prior 
discipline and obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings. Probation is a sanction that 
should be reserved for professional misconduct that lends itself to correction, with a 
respondent willing to cooperate, and not employed for conduct giving rise to questions 
about the attorney's fundamental integrity. 
The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") identify and define 
probation as a sanction for professional misconduct, but do not provide guidance 
concerning when probation may or should be imposed. Compare Rule 2, Standards, with 
Rule 4, Standards. The OPC considers probation a useful tool for correcting practice 
errors that arise from ignorance or lack of diligence or communication. Conversely, the 
OPC views probation unsuitable as a sanction for conduct involving knowing or intentional 
dishonesty with clients or courts. Consistent with this approach, the OPC last year 
determined not to appeal a District Court decision imposing probation in a setting 
involving negligence. 
Recently, however, two District Court decisions have imposed or permitted 
probation for severe breaches of the attorneys' duties of honesty in various aspects of 
their practices. Although they differ in their particulars, each of the cases involved the 
respondent's knowing and intentional dishonesty to clients, third-parties, or to a tribunal. 
Because of its serious concerns about fairness to respondents and the desirability of 
promoting consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for similar offenses, as 
well as its concerns about protecting the public and the administration of justice, the OPC 
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seeks review of the District Court decision in this case and in In re Crawley, which has 
been consolidated herewith. The OPC asks the Court to articulate criteria for the 
imposition of probations, thereby providing guidance to the OPC and the District Courts, 
and urges some particular standards for the Court's consideration. Finally, if the Court 
concludes that the District Court erred in permitting Henderson to petition to be placed on 
probation, it requests that the Court reverse that portion of the Order, and require 
Henderson to remain on suspension for the entire year-long period. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S GUIDANCE IS NEEDED CONCERNING CRITERIA FOR 
IMPOSING PROBATIONS 
A. Appropriate Sanctions Are the Linchpins of an Effective Attorney 
Discipline System, and Probation Has Its Place 
An effective attorney discipline system depends upon appropriate and consistently 
applied sanctions for professional misconduct. The American Bar Association's Joint 
Committee on Professional Sanctions stated it this way: 
For lawyer discipline to be truly effective, sanctions must be based on 
clearly developed standards. Inappropriate sanctions can undermine the 
goals of lawyer discipline: sanctions which are too lenient fail to adequately 
deter misconduct and thus lower public confidence in the profession; 
sanctions which are too onerous may impair confidence in the system and 
deter lawyers from reporting ethical violations on the part of other lawyers. 
Inconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction or among jurisdictions, 
cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary 
systems. 
I.A., Preface, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (as amended Feb. 1992). 
10 
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In Utah, the explicit purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "is to ensure and 
maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the 
discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the 
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are 
unable or unlikely to properly discharge their professional responsibilities." Rule 1(a), 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"); see also Rule 1.1, Standards. To this 
end, the Court adopted the Standards in 1993. See Compiler's Notes, Standards. 
The Standards constitute a system "designed for use in imposing a sanction or 
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a 
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct." Rule 1.3, Standards. They allow for 
"flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct" 
and are designed to promote consideration of all relevant factors and their appropriate 
weight "in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline." Rule 1.3, Standards. 
B. The Standards Identify Probation as a Possible Sanction, But Provide 
No Framework Concerning the Circumstances Under Which Probation 
Is Appropriate 
Rule 2 of the Standards is titled "Sanctions," and identifies discipline ranging from 
the most to the least severe: disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, admonitions. See 
Rule 2, Standards. The list of possible sanctions also includes resignation with discipline 
pending, reciprocal discipline, and probation. See id. Each sanction is defined in the 
rule, except for a short list of "Other sanctions and remedies" that includes restitution, the 
assessment of costs, and the like. See id. As defined in Rule 2, "Probation is a sanction 
11 
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that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or 
nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be 
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement." Rule 2.7, Standards. 
Another rule in the Standards identifies the circumstances under which 
disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, and admonitions are the appropriate presumptive 
sanction. See Rule 4, Standards. Rule 4 does not offer guidance concerning when 
probation is an appropriate sanction, nor does it identify the circumstances under which 
the sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and reciprocal discipline should be 
imposed. See id. Procedures for seeking resignations with discipline pending and 
reciprocal discipline are identified by specific rules in the RLDD, but the RLDD do not 
address probation. See Rule 21 (Resignation with Discipline Pending), RLDD; Rule 22 
(Reciprocal Discipline), RLDD. Thus, probation is the only sanction other than the list of 
"Other sanctions and remedies," with no corresponding rule in the Standards identifying 
when it is appropriate, or a rule in the RLDD identifying how it may be imposed. 
C. Although Probations or Their Equivalent Have Long Been Available in 
Utah, The Question of When to Impose Them Appears to Be a Matter 
of First Impression 
Probations or their functional equivalent—stayed suspensions1—were not explicitly 
identified among the sanctions noted in the body of rules that preceded today's RLDD 
1
 Because a stayed suspension with conditions which, if not met, would trigger 
reinstatement of the suspension, the OPC regards stayed suspensions as the 
functional equivalent of probations. Courts and other tribunals do not appear to draw a 
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and Standards, but were available under the Supreme Court's inherent powers. See e.g. 
Rules of Conduct and Discipline of the Utah State Bar, effective Nov. 1931 (Board of Bar 
Commissioners could recommend reprimand, suspension, or disbarment, and Supreme 
Court may exercise its inherent powers and "take any action agreeable to its judgment"); 
Rules V and VI, section 51, Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
effective Mar. 1940. 
The OPC's review of Supreme Court opinions concerning lawyer discipline 
revealed only a handful of cases in which probation was imposed or alluded to, but none 
in which the Court discussed criteria that would make probation an appropriate option. 
See e.g. In re Stoddard, 793 P.2d 373, 374-375, 377 (Utah 1990) (suspension stayed 
and probation imposed for unintentional lack of diligence, but attorney violated conditions 
and probation was revoked); In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 807, 809-810 (Utah 1990) 
(attorney intentionally converted funds belonging to one client as payment for a debt 
owed by another client; Court imposed six-month suspension, with five months stayed on 
condition of payment of restitution and costs);2 In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 262-263 
(Utah 1992) (opinion alluded to attorney's probation by consent for what appear to have 
more rigorous distinction between the two, and this Brief will not attempt to further 
distinguish them. 
2
 Justice Stewart's opinion included a footnote stating that "a six-month suspension, even 
if five months is stayed, is oppressive and unreasonable." Id. at 810 n.5. He added, 
"Petitioner's conduct is not, in my view, that egregious." Id. He also cautioned that "it is 
ill-advised to impose an over long period of suspension and then stay part of it to gain 
leverage to compel an attorney to comply with other specific remedies. There are ample 
means to compel compliance short of that." Id. 
n 
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been diligence and communication problems, but probation was revoked and this case 
involved allegations of attorney practicing while suspended); In re Schwenke, 849 P.2d 
573, 575 (Utah 1993) (opinion noted Court's acceptance of Bar recommendation to place 
attorney on supervised probation for neglect of two matters; this case addressed 
allegations concerning attorney's failure to comply with Court orders); In re Cassity, 875 
P.2d 548, 548 (Utah 1994) (public reprimand and six months' probation for case 
prosecuted as fee dispute).3 
D. The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions Include Probation as a Potential Discipline But Do Not 
Provide Criteria for Employing It 
Utah's Standards are a substantially revised and streamlined version of the 
American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA's 
Standards"). See Summary, Standards; In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 212. Their 
purposes "are nonetheless the same." Babilis, 951 P.2d at 212. 
The ABA's Standards identify probation among the possible sanctions for 
professional misconduct. See Standard 2.7, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, as amended Feb. 1992. The language of the ABA's probation provision 
differs from the one employed in Utah, but its effect is similar: "Probation is a sanction 
that allows a lawyer to practice under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed 
alone or in conjunction with a reprimand, an admonition or immediately following a 
suspension. Probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or 
3
 This case is discussed in greater detail below. 
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reinstatement." Id. Notably, the ABA Standards do not include a suggested framework 
for determining when probation is appropriate, nor do they offer guidance concerning 
how it should be imposed. 
E. Probation Is Available In Most Other States, But the Criteria for 
Imposing It Vary 
With some exceptions, the disciplinary rules of other states include probation 
among the range of sanctions available for attorney misconduct. The OPC has compiled 
summary information concerning these rules. See Summary Chart of State Rules 
Governing Probations and Stayed Suspensions, a copy of which is provided in the 
Addendum. Conceptually, the states may be divided into those in which probation is not 
provided for under the rules governing attorney discipline but the courts sometimes 
impose it pursuant to their inherent authority; those in which probation is available under 
conditions specified in the rules; and those, such as Utah, in which probation is explicitly 
provided for, but no criteria are identified in the rules. 
1. Some Jurisdictions Have Rules Permitting Probation Only When 
Specified Conditions Have Been Satisfied 
Jurisdictions with rules permitting probation often identify conditions that must be 
satisfied before probation can be imposed. These often include a proviso that probation 
may only be imposed if there is little likelihood of harm to the public. See e.g. Rule 8(h), 
Ala. R. of Disciplinary Pro. Others include a proviso that the conditions of probation must 
be adequately supervised. See e.g. Section 17E(7), Ark. Sup. Ct. Pro. of Regulating 
Conduct of Attorneys at Law. 
i * 
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Even where probation is permitted under certain conditions, the rules in other 
jurisdictions usually are silent concerning the underlying misconduct and mental state for 
which probation may be imposed. The exception is that a handful of rules in other 
jurisdictions expressly limit probations to conduct that would not warrant disbarment. See 
e.g. Rule 251.7, Colo. R. Civ. Pro. As far as the OPC can tell, Texas is the only state with 
more finely calibrated criteria related to the misconduct itself. See Rule 15.11, Texas R. 
of Disciplinary Pro. (probation cannot be used if respondent received public reprimand or 
fully probated suspension in last five years for same rule violations, or two fully probated 
suspensions in last five years, or received two public reprimands in last five years for 
conflict of interest, theft, or failure to return clearly unearned fee). 
2. Reported Cases From Other Jurisdictions Sometimes Offer a 
Useful Perspective on Probation as a Disciplinary Sanction 
The OPC's search for reported cases involving probation as a disciplinary sanction 
revealed numerous cases in which probation was employed without comment from the 
court concerning the underlying misconduct and attorney's mental state that might 
warrant such a sanction. Several cases were more helpful in articulating the courts' 
reasoning, however, and these are summarized here. 
In its first such decision, In re Jantz, the Supreme Court of Kansas4 considered 
whether to stay the suspension of an attorney who converted client funds and lied to a 
judge about it. See In re Jantz, 763 P.2d 626, 772-773 (Kan. 1988) (noting that the 
4
 Kansas is a jurisdiction in which probation is not explicitly provided by rule. 
1 A 
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court had "not used probation nor have we 'suspended' the execution of such 
suspension."). Pursuant to the Kansas Supreme Court Rules Relating to Discipline of 
Attorneys, which provide for disbarment, suspension, censure, or informal admonition, 
and "[a]ny other form of discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any type 
of discipline stated above, . . . which the Supreme Court deems appropriate,"5 the 
Kansas Supreme Court adopted the hearing panel's recommendation. See id. at 775-
776. The court emphasized, however, that the case was "unique" because of the many 
mitigating circumstances,6 and noted that it had "rarely failed to disbar or suspend any 
attorney whose professional misconduct parallels that of the respondent." Id. at 775. 
The unique circumstances were these: 
The conduct complained of here took place within a very short period of 
time; there were no complaints against respondent prior to these 
incidents. These took place when respondent was under severe 
emotional distress, caused by the terminal illness of his father and his own 
financial problems. Mr. Jantz admitted his misconduct to the judge 
promptly. He has admitted the misconduct to his client and to the bar 
where he practices. He made prompt restitution of the funds, which were 
not at that time due the client but were paid by him into the hands of the 
clerk of the district court, to await further order of the court. By the time 
the disciplinary proceedings were underway, Jantz had already made 
restitution, had commenced professional counseling (which is continuing), 
and had prepared a plan for retirement of his debts and financial 
obligations. We were told at the time of oral argument that he has made a 
substantial reduction of his obligations since the panel hearing in March of 
this year. His practice is growing, indicating that he is accepted by the 
members of the bench and bar as well as the residents of the community 
where he resides and practices. 
5
 Rule 203(a)(5), Kan. Sup. Ct. R. Relating to Discipline of Attorneys. 
6
 Apparently there were no aggravating factors, either. 
i n 
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Id. 
Since then, the Kansas Supreme Court has rejected other requests for 
probation, noting that "unique" circumstances are those "from which it reasonably could 
be inferred that the attorney's misconduct was a one-time response to adversity and 
that it would be highly unlikely that he would repeat his mistake." See e.g. In re 
Scimeca, 962 P.2d 1080, 1090 (Kan 1998) (indefinitely suspended respondent, among 
other things, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and for 
misconduct in dealing with clients, notwithstanding his contention that he suffers from 
depression and is treating it, has filed personal and business bankruptcies, his son 
suffers from a head injury, he apologized to the judge, and the incident involving the 
judge was isolated). 
In New Hampshire,7 the Supreme Court considered probation for an attorney's 
trust account violations that involved among other things, commingling and failures to 
maintain proper trust account records. See In re Morgan's Case, 727 A.2d 985, 987 
(N.H. 1999). Although the attorney's "apparent ignorance of the rules cannot justify 
their violation," the court concluded that the mitigating factors included self-reporting, 
remedial efforts, stipulation to the facts, a lack of prior discipline, and absence of harm, 
warranted a conditionally delayed suspension. Id. The court observed: "It is significant 
that the respondent's actions were not motivated by dishonesty, for attorney misconduct 
7
 New Hampshire is a jurisdiction without an explicit rule providing for probation. 
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involving dishonesty reflects most negatively on the legal profession and will not be 
tolerated" Id. (emphasis added). 
In Oregon,8 the Supreme Court rejected probation for an attorney's intentional 
dishonesty with a client, noting that a condition of probation is only appropriate when 
there is a correlation between it and the ethical violation. See e.g. In re Butler, 921 P.2d 
401, 404 (Ore. 1996). It concluded that "a lengthy suspension will provide greater 
protection to the public." Id. More recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon "advise[d] the 
Bar that we do not favor probationary terms unless they are the result of stipulation. 
When a lawyer's misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant a lengthy probationary 
period, the uncertainties of the monitoring process lead us to prefer, when appropriate, 
imposition of a sanction involving a concrete period of time." In re Obert, 89 P.3d 1173, 
1181 (Ore. 2004). 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota9 may grant probation, but "only [in] the most 
extreme, extenuating circumstances," such as physical illness that precipitated a severe 
depressive reaction which was causally related to the misconduct and had been 
remedied; the misconduct had been rectified; there was no indication of fraud or deceit; 
the attorney had made significant community contributions, and had no disciplinary 
history. See In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. 1980). 
8
 Oregon has a rule providing for probation. 
9
 Minnesota's rules provide for probation. 
1Q 
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Probation is imposed infrequently in the District of Columbia, and only when the 
respondent's conduct was influenced by a remediable disability. See e.g. In re Bradbury, 
608 A.2d 1218, 1219 (D.C. 1992); see also In re Stow, 633 A.2d 782, (D.C. 1993) 
(probation appropriate for neglect of practice in light of respondent's acquiescence in 
sanction). 
F. Probation Appears to Be Emerging As a Sanction Imposed Sua 
Sponte By the District Court 
Last year, the District Court imposed a one-year suspension upon an attorney 
who violated various Rules of Professional Conduct in several client matters, but 
granted the attorney leave to petition the court to stay all but three months on condition 
that she undergo supervision for up to nine months. See Ruling and Order Re: 
Sanctions, In re Lang, Case Nos. 010910847 and 030908681, March 28, 2005, a copy 
of which is supplied in the Addendum. The attorney had violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 
1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(d) 
(Misconduct), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). See id. at 1. With the exception of her failure 
to respond to the OPC, none of the violations were intentional; some violations were 
knowing, others were merely negligent. See id. at 5-9. There were aggravating factors 
in the form of dishonest and selfish motives as to some misconduct; a pattern of 
misconduct; multiple offenses; obstruction of the disciplinary process; refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; and substantial experience with 
10
 Minnesota's rules provide for probation. 
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respect to some matters. See id. at 9-12. Mitigating factors were: absence of a prior 
record (but this was accorded little weight); inexperience as to some of the matters; and 
interim reform. See id. at 12-15. The court found that suspension was the presumptive 
sanction, although it noted that disbarment might be justified and appropriate. See id. 
at 15. 
The District Court "wrestled with its options," in the face of "the recurring question 
[of] just what sanction might give [the attorney] the best possible chance to make 
fundamental changes that could substantially improve her prospects of practicing law 
until retirement without being plagued by continuing allegations of professional 
misconduct." Id. at 15. The court explained its reasons for permitting the lawyer to 
petition for a stay: 
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one 
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension. As already 
indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption of suspension 
is overcome in this case in any way that would justify the lesser sanctions 
urged by [the attorney]. Accordingly, the sanction must include 
suspension, but the court firmly believes that a suspension of six months, 
or even one year, without a more proactive component, will do anything to 
change [the attorney's] professional conduct in the long term. There must 
be a term of actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this 
lawyer's misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a 
period of supervised practice to give [the attorney] a chance to see how 
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of 
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other counsel, and 
the courts. 
Id. at 15-16. Ultimately, the attorney successfully petitioned for the stay of suspension. 
See Order Staying the Respondent's Suspension and Concerning the Respondent's 
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Reinstatement to the Practice of Law Upon Termination of the Period of Suspension, In 
re Lang, Civil No. 010910847, a copy of which is included in the Addendum. 
Although it had urged a sanction other than probation, the OPC concluded the 
District Court had not erred in imposing the suspension plus probation in the foregoing 
case. Indeed, the OPC has sometimes stipulated to proposals for a respondent's 
probation when the misconduct originated from something that clearly could be 
remedied and the OPC is also persuaded of the attorney's commitment to change and 
to cooperate. For example, negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer 
to "provide competent representation to a client;"11 negligent conduct in violation of the 
rule requiring lawyers to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client;"12 negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter.13 In such circumstances, where it 
appears that appropriate additional training or mentoring would eliminate the problems 
without further injury to any client, probation is arguably the most effective means of 
securing long-term protection of the public. Significantly, progress can be reported, 
measured, and verified if necessary, thereby adequately insuring protection of the 
public, the courts, and the profession. 
11
 Rule 1.1, R. Pro. Con. 
12
 Rule 1.3, R. Pro. Con. 
13
 Rule 1.4, R. Pro. Con. 
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G. The OPC Urges the Court to Exercise Its Special Role in Governing the 
Practice of Law By Providing the Guidance Requested 
Pursuant to Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court "plays a special role in 
governing the practice of law," which "includes overseeing the discipline of persons 
admitted to practice law." In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). Trial court 
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but the Court "reserve[s] the 
right to draw different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the trial court." Id. 
Significantly, "[w]ith respect to the discipline actually imposed, our constitutional 
responsibility requires [the Court] to make an independent determination as to its 
correctness." Id. In one of the first cases brought under the new disciplinary scheme 
inaugurated in 1993, the Court said, "Although we recognize as a general proposition the 
district court's advantaged position in overall familiarity with the evidence and the context 
of the case, on appeal we must treat the ultimate determination of discipline as our 
responsibility." Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213. 
The Court has exercised this role in the past by providing guidance concerning 
how the Standards should be applied. For example, in the Ince case, the Court noted 
that "Although the new Standards are intended to preserve a measure of flexibility in 
assigning sanctions, the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the uncertainty that 
existed under the old rules. Therefore, we offer the following guidance as to the 
application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under rule 6 [of the Standards]." 
In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998) (aggravating and mitigating factors must be 
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significant to warrant departing from presumptive level of discipline set forth in 
Standards). 
Justice Durham's concurring and dissenting opinion in another disciplinary matter, 
In re Johnson, elaborated upon the Court's role in attorney misconduct matters: 
This court is charged by the Utah Constitution with the obligation to regulate 
the practice of law. We have delegated the screening, fact-finding, and 
initial judgment regarding discipline to the Utah State Bar and to the district 
courts, but we retain the final authority to oversee the system. When the 
prosecuting entity and the disciplined attorney accede to the 
appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the trial courts, or 
at least fail to challenge it, we lend out constitutional authority to the finality 
of the determination. Such trial court decisions, of course, create no 
precedent for the disposition of other cases. Where a sanction is 
challenged, however, this court undertakes a function that goes beyond the 
review of an individual case. We arbitrate questions of proportionality, rules 
of law, and guidelines for the imposition of sanctions that have general 
application for the practice of law in Utah. Our decisions interpret the Rules 
of Professional Conduct and develop the principles of application that will 
guide lawyers, the Bar, and the trial courts. 
In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, U 21 (Durham, J. , concurring and dissenting). Justice 
Durham also noted the trial courts' "more limited perspective on the disciplinary system" 
and observed that "[i]t is not at all unexpected that a trial judge's best assessment of the 
trend of developing law turns out to be 'wrong' in the sense that this court will reject it and 
opt for a different interpretation or policy." Id. at U 23. 
It is in this spirit that the OPC seeks review of the Henderson case and its 
companion case, In re Crawley. The Court's decision here will have a significant bearing 
on future disciplinary cases, as well as the cases in issue here. 
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II. PROBATION SHOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE FOR MISCONDUCT THAT IS 
AMENDABLE TO CORRECTION 
A. Probation Is an Appropriate Sanction for Some Misconduct 
Consistent with the goal of protecting the public and the administration of justice, 
probation is a means of ensuring that reform has occurred. Likewise, probation imposed 
in conjunction with other sanctions and remedies, such as a requirement that the lawyer 
attend continuing education courses, or work under the supervision of another lawyer,14 is 
a significant tool for ensuring and maintaining high standards of professional conduct.15 
The factors for determining when to use probation are a more difficult question. 
Rule 4 of Utah's Standards identifies the presumptive sanctions for certain types of 
misconduct, but does not include probation as an appropriate presumptive sanction. 
See Rule 4, Standards. Accordingly, probation appears to be an appropriate final 
sanction—that is, a sanction ultimately imposed upon consideration of the factors 
identified in Rule 3 of the Standards, which include the duty violated, the lawyer's 
mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct, and aggravating 
14
 Rule 2 of the Standards provides for the imposition of other sanctions and remedies, 
including "a requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses." Rule 2.9, 
Standards. 
15
 The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has 
observed that if probation is not available as a sanction for lawyers in need of supervision 
but who could "perform useful services," the only choices are "suspension, which involves 
an unnecessary deprivation of the lawyer's livelihood, or continuation of practice, which 
involves a possible threat to the public." Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Longenecker, 538 
So.2d156, 164 n.1 (La. 1989). 
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and mitigating factors—but not a presumptive sanction. See Rule 3.1, Standards. 
Probation, then, is a legitimate ultimate solution, but when should it be imposed? 
B. The Factors Identified in Rule 3 of the Standards Should Be 
Considered in Imposing a Sanction of Probation 
Although the Standards are brief, being comprised of just six rules, they are 
nevertheless loaded with the criteria necessary for promoting a rational and thorough 
consideration of all relevant factors. Rule 3 is the rule that explicitly draws together 
these factors: 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a 
finding of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) The duty violated; 
(b) The lawyer's mental state; 
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; 
and 
(d) The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Rule 3.1, Standards. The sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and 
reciprocal discipline are not governed by Rule 3 because the factors are inapplicable, 
and they are addressed by explicit separate provisions of the RLDD. By contrast, the 
factors identified in Rule 3 are readily applicable in probation settings, and probation is 
not addressed by the RLDD. Accordingly, the Rule 3 factors should be considered in 
imposing the sanction of probation, and these are discussed below. 
Lawyers owe duties to clients, tribunals, the public, and the profession. These 
are not set forth in the Standards, but are embedded in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. For example, duties to clients are inherent in the rules requiring an attorney 
26 
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to provide competent, diligent representation and adequate communication. See e.g. 
Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, R. Pro. Con. A lawyer has a duty to maintain the integrity of 
the profession. See e.g. Rules 8.1 and 8.3, R. Pro. Con. Of particular significance for 
this case, a lawyer also owes duties of honesty and candor to tribunals and opposing 
counsel, as well as a duty of fairness to opposing parties. See e.g. Rules 8.4, 4.1, 4.4, 
R. Pro. Con. 
As to the relevant mental states, these are identified and defined in the 
Standards: 
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result. 
"Knowledge is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant 
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or 
purpose to accomplish a particular result. 
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that 
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the 
situation. 
Definitions, Standards. 
Injury may be actual or potential, and its level can range from "serious" to "little or 
no." See Definitions, Standards. Injury and potential injury includes harm to clients, the 
public, the legal system, or the profession. See id. 
The Standards set forth a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in Rule 6, and this Court has provided guidance concerning their 
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existence and the weight they should be accorded. See Rule 6, Standards; see also 
e.g. In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998). 
C. In the OPC's View, Probation Is Not Appropriate When the 
Respondent Has Intentionally or Knowingly Violated Duties of 
Honesty and Candor 
Employing the Rule 3 factors, the OPC has concluded that probation should not 
be available as a sanction when the duty violated was the duty to deal honestly with 
clients, tribunals, or third parties, and when the lawyer's mental state in committing the 
misconduct was knowing or intentional. Further, probation is not appropriate when 
certain aggravating factors are present, a point addressed later. 
Any sanction should maintain respect for the profession and protect the public, 
and should be sufficient to prevent recurrence of the misconduct and deter others from 
engaging in similar misconduct. Moreover, the degree of discipline must correspond to 
the gravity of the misconduct. Collectively, the question is whether the discipline is 
appropriate in light of the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative weight of the 
disciplinary rule violations, the potential harm to the public, and the harm to the legal 
profession itself. 
With these considerations in mind, probations in disciplinary matters involving an 
attorney's intentional or knowing dishonesty are inappropriate because the misconduct 
reflects an absence of integrity that cannot be remedied with further training or 
supervision. Moreover, a respondent's reform cannot be verified. Indeed, absent 24-
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hour supervision, a supervising attorney cannot possible know if there have been 
further misrepresentations or other lapses of integrity. 
The OPC's position derives in part from the seriousness with which the Court 
has treated discipline matters involving an attorney's lack of integrity in a variety of 
settings. See e.g. In re Norton, 146 P.2d 899, 900-901 (Utah 1944) (attorney "charged 
with an attempt to deceive this court" by intentionally misrepresenting that an exhibit 
had been admitted in evidence; although attempt was unsuccessful, the Court imposed 
one-year suspension); In re Bybee, 629 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1988) (attorney's lack of 
truthfulness and candor to a court warranted a suspension; such conduct, "if allowed 
without proper restraint and punishment, would undermine our system of justice."); In re 
Cassity, 875 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah 1994) (had Cassity's misrepresentation to a court 
"been charged and prosecuted before the hearing as an independent act of professional 
misconduct, disbarment or suspension may have been appropriate, but that was not the 
case."). In his concurring opinion in Cassity, Chief Justice Zimmerman wrote, 
Conduct such as Cassity's factual misrepresentation to the court 
strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of the adversary system. The 
importance of a lawyer's obligation of candor to the tribunal cannot be 
overstated. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to be advocates for their 
clients, not to be their co-conspirators. . . . It would ignore reality to 
recognize that at times, cultural and economic pressures cause some 
lawyers to forget the distinction. . . . But when such conduct comes to 
light, I think it should be punished harshly to serve as continuing notice on 
errant members of the profession that we will not tolerate it. Severe 
punishment also assures the public that, despite the cynical teachings of 
popular culture that lawyers are prostitutes in nice clothing fit only for 
dinosaur food, in fact, lawyers are bound by rigid ethical standards which 
are designed to preserve the integrity of the adversary system. 
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Cassity, 875 P.2d at 552 (citations omitted) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring). 
D. Probation Should Only Be Available When Certain Aggravating 
Factors Are Not Present 
Additionally, even in cases not involving misconduct based upon an attorney's 
intentional or knowing violation of duties of honesty, probation would not be appropriate 
when aggravating factors suggest that the respondent is unlikely to cooperate with the 
OPC and has not demonstrated the self-awareness that is a necessary component of a 
true commitment to change. In other words, an attorney whose misconduct was 
dishonestly motivated,16 who denies responsibility,17 who engages in deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary proceeding,18 or who displays an uncooperative attitude 
toward the proceedings,19 is an unlikely candidate for the rehabilitative possibilities 
offered by probation. 
III. HENDERSON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION GIVEN 
THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES VIOLATED AND THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. Henderson Intentionally Misled the Tribunal 
Henderson's lack of candor to the ALJ was intentional: he told the ALJ he had 
withdrawn from the representation because his client's case had settled, but the case 
Rule 6.2(b), Standards (dishonest motive is an aggravating circumstance). 
17
 Rule 6.2(f), Standards (refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of misconduct is an 
aggravating circumstance). 
18
 Rule 6.2(f), Standards (submission of false statements or evidence, or other deceptive 
practices during disciplinary process is an aggravating circumstance). 
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had not settled. This violation of Rule 3.3 was a failure of his most fundamental duty to 
the tribunal and the profession. 
B. The Aggravating Factors Suggest That Henderson Is a Poor 
Candidate for the Reform That Is the Goal of Probation 
As the Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions noted among the aggravating 
circumstances, Henderson had prior discipline, and indeed had been suspended for 
similar violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct: "failing to provide competent 
representation, failing to communicate with clients, missing a court hearing and filing a 
false Affidavit." For this misconduct, Henderson was suspended for two years, with all 
but six months stayed. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of 
Suspension and Probation, In re Henderson, Civil No. 990910496, offered and 
accepted as OPC Exhibit 1, a copy of which is reproduced in the Addendum. This was 
entitled to significant weight in determining the appropriate ultimate sanction, among 
other things because Henderson did not learn from it, and it is difficult to see how 
Henderson's practices might benefit from another period of probation. Moreover, 
Henderson was in violation of the previous order. See In re Doncouse, 2004 UT 77 U 
19 (to effectively deter future misconduct, penalty for violating order of suspension must 
be more severe than original suspension). 
19
 Rule 6.2(e), Standards (obstruction of disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing 
to comply with rules or orders is an aggravating circumstance). 
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Henderson also obstructed the disciplinary proceedings in various ways and 
refused to acknowledge his wrongdoing. How can someone with so little regard for the 
system and so little self-reflection be a good candidate for a successful probation? 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate responsibility for disciplinary cases lies with this Court, and in light of 
its unique role in regulating the profession, the OPC asks the Court for guidance 
concerning the underlying misconduct and attorney's mental state for which probation is 
appropriate. Such guidance will provide enormous assistance to the OPC, the District 
Court, and future respondents, because it will promote consistency in sanctions for similar 
types of misconduct. 
If the OPC has correctly concluded that probation is inappropriate as a sanction for 
misconduct involving an attorney's breach of the fundamental duty of honesty to clients or 
the courts or third parties, particularly when there are significant aggravating factors 
suggesting that the respondent attorney is not amenable to reform, the OPC asks the 
Court to adopt this as a bright-line test for determining the availability of probation. 
Additionally, if the Court concludes that the District Court erred in permitting 
Henderson to petition for probation after a period of actual suspension, the OPC requests 
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that the Court reverse that portion of the Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions and impose the 
full term of suspension upon Henderson. 
DATED: August 2 ^ , 2006. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Kate A. Toomey 
Deputy Counsel 
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Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief 
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
2.1. Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer 
upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in 
professional misconduct. 
2.2. Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's 
status as a lawyer. A lawyer who has been disbarred may be 
readmitted as provided in Rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability. 
2.3. Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer 
from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. 
Generally, suspension should be imposed for a specific period of 
time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the 
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three 
years. 
(a) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less 
may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 24 of the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability. 
(b) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six 
months may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 25 of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
2.4. Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the 
temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. Interim 
suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 18 and 19 of the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
2.5. Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which 
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the 
lawyer's right to practice. 
2.6. Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which 
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the 
lawyer's right to practice. 
2.7. Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer 
to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public 
or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other 
sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or 
reinstatement. 
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2.8. Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with 
discipline pending is a form of public discipline which allows a 
respondent to resign from the practice of law while either an 
informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent. 
Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in 
Rule 21 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
2.9. Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and 
remedies which may be imposed include: 
(a) restitution; 
(b) assessment of costs; 
(c) limitation upon practice; 
(d) appointment of a receiver; 
(e) a requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or 
professional responsibility examination; and 
(f) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education 
courses. 
2.10. Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the 
imposition of a disciplinary sanction on a lawyer who has been 
disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory 
body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
3.1. Generally. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a 
sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
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Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
4.1. Generally. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon 
application of the factors set out in Standard 3.1, the following 
sanctions are generally appropriate. 
4.2. Disbarment. 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined 
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the 
court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary 
element of which includes intentional interference with the 
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or 
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.3. Suspension. 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined 
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the 
legal system, or causes interference or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the 
elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.4. Reprimand. 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as 
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
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Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal 
system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in any other misconduct that involves 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.5. Admonition. 
Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as 
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the 
legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a 
party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise 
identified in this Standard 4 that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
6.1. Generally. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances may be considered and weighed in 
deciding what sanction to impose. 
6.2. Aggravating circumstances. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors 
that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) prior record of discipline; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally 
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary 
authority; 
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(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled 
substances. 
6.3. Mitigating circumstances. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors 
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) personal or emotional problems; 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary 
authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative 
attitude toward proceedings; 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(g) good character or reputation; 
(h) physical disability; 
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance 
abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or 
mental disability; and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally 
contributed to the misconduct; and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained 
period of successful rehabilitation; and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence 
of that misconduct is unlikely; 
(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided 
that the respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and 
provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice 
resulting from the delay; 
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental 
disability or impairment; 
(I) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(m) remorse; and 
(n) remoteness of prior offenses. 
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6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating. 
The following circumstances should not be considered as 
either aggravating or mitigating: 
(a) forced or compelled restitution; 
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary 
proceedings; 
(d) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(e) failure of injured client to complain. 
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Diane Akiyama, #7125 
Assistant Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the ] 
Discipline of: 
J. Keith Henderson, #01459 
Respondent. 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
I AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040903585 
Judge L. A. Dever 
On March 2, 2005 the Utah State Bar's Office of Conduct ("OPC") filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment seeking judgment against Respondent for violating rules 1.1 
(Competence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating 
Representation), 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal), 8.4(d) (Misconduct), and 8.4(a) of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. On April 11, 2005, Respondent's Response to Utah 
State Bar Office of Professional Conduct Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
requesting the Court amend or withdraw the admissions deemed admitted. On April 25, 
2005, the OPC filed it's Reply to Respondent's Response to Utah State Bar's Office of 
Professional Conduct's Motion for Summary Judgment 
\ rA I 
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Based on the foregoing the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as to the misconduct phase of these proceedings. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 10, 1994, Mr. Blakley was involved in an on the job 
accident ("Accident") when the truck he was driving overturned. 
2. Mr. Blakley retained Mr. Henderson to pursue unpaid worker's 
compensation claims that Mr. Blakley filed with the worker's compensation insurance 
carrier, American Insurance Company ("American Insurance"). 
3. Mr. Henderson knew that Mr. Blakley was pursuing a personal injury claim 
against the other driver in the Accident. 
4. Mr. Henderson did not inform Mr. Blakley that a settlement in the personal 
injury case could affect Mr. Blakley's worker's compensation claim. 
5. Around January 2000, Mr. Blakley's personal injury attorney settled the 
personal injury claim against the third party defendant in the Accident. 
6. On or about February 3, 2000, Mr. Henderson filed an Application for 
Hearing requesting a hearing before the Labor Commission for the State of Utah 
("Labor Commission") regarding Mr. Blakley's unpaid worker's compensation claims. 
7. Prior to filing the Application for Hearing, Mr. Henderson failed to 
determine the status of Mr. Blakley's personal injury case. 
8. On March 16, 2000, American Insurance filed an Amended Response to 
Application for Hearing asserting a counterclaim for reimbursement for past payments 
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and offset of future payments to Mr. Blakley because Mr. Blakley received settlement 
proceeds from the defendant in his personal injury case. 
9. The Labor Commission set a hearing on Mr. Blakley's worker's 
compensation claim for June 2, 2000. 
10. Mr. Henderson did not give Mr. Blakley a copy of the Response to 
Application Hearing or the Amended Response to Application for Hearing before June 
2, 2000. 
11. On June 2, 2000, Mr. Henderson met with Mr. Blakley just prior to the 
hearing and as they traveled to the hearing. 
12. Prior to and after the June 2, 2000 hearing, Mr. Henderson failed to fully 
explain to Mr. Blakley how Mr. Blakley's settlement in his personal injury case would 
affect his pending and future worker's compensation claims. 
13. At the June 2, 2000 hearing, Debbie L. Hann, the Administrative Law 
Judge ("ALJ") continued the hearing without date to see if the parties could reach a 
settlement regarding the amount of compensation that American Insurance would 
receive. 
14. After the June 2, 2000 hearing, Mr. Blakley did not hear again from Mr. 
Henderson until he received Mr. Henderson's letter dated November 30, 2000, stating 
that American Insurance had a right to the third party personal injury settlement and Mr. 
Blakley was not entitled to recover a worker's compensation award. 
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15. On November 9, 2000, the Third District Court for the State of Utah 
entered an Order suspending Mr. Henderson from the practice of law for two years, with 
all but six months stayed. 
16. Mr. Henderson did not notify Mr. Blakley that he was being suspended 
from the practice of law and could no longer represent Mr. Blakley. 
17. Mr. Henderson did not inform Mr. Blakley that he needed to get another 
attorney or he would need to represent himself pro se in the matter. 
18. Mr. Henderson did not provide Mr. Blakley with a copy of his file. 
19. Mr. Henderson did not notify Mr. Blakley that the next hearing in his case 
was set for February 27, 2001 and that Mr. Blakley should attend the hearing. 
20. On or about February 27, 2001, the ALJ conducted a status conference 
hearing in Mr. Blakley's case. 
21. When Mr. Henderson did not appear at the February 27, 2001 hearing, the 
ALJ telephoned Mr. Henderson. 
22. During the February 27, 2001 telephone conversation, Mr. Henderson 
informed the ALJ that he had withdrawn from the case because the case had settled. 
23. As of February 27, 2001, Mr. Blakley had not reached a settlement with 
American Insurance. 
24. During the February 27, 2001 telephone conversation, the ALJ directed 
Mr. Henderson to file a withdrawal of counsel within ten days so the case could be 
moved forward. 
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25. Mr. Henderson did not submit his withdrawal of counsel to the Labor 
Commission until October 15, 2002. 
26. On December 27, 2004, the OPC served by mail discovery requests on 
Mr. Henderson, consisting of Interrogatories, Request for Admissions, and Request for 
Production of Documents. 
27. On April 11, 2005, Mr. Henderson served by mail Respondent's Response 
to the Utah State Bar's OPC's Interrogatories, Response to Request for Production of 
Documents and Discovery Requests Requests for Admissions dated April 8, 2005. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
Mr. Henderson's Motion for Withdrawal of Admissions 
Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says that any matter admitted 
under this Rule is conclusively established unless the court commits to withdrawal or 
amendment of the admission. The case Langeland v. Monarch Motors sets out the 
standard for determining whether or not it is proper to allow these matters to be 
withdrawn or amended. 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah, 1998). It says that Mr. Henderson must 
show: 1) That the matter deemed admitted against him is relevant to the merits of the 
underlying cause of action; and 2) Introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of 
specific facts indicating that the matters deemed admitted are in fact untrue. The Court 
deduces the answers to the admissions are denied and that is all he says. The Court 
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reviewed the answers to the interrogatories. The vast majority of which says this is 
information that has previously been supplied. The Court believes Mr. Henderson has 
failed to meet the standard under Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
will not allow his submissions to be withdrawn. 
OPC's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based upon the information before the Court and the admissions that have been 
deemed admitted by the Court, summary judgment will be granted to Bar counsel in this 
matter regarding rules 1.1, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.3(a), 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct as alleged by the OPC in its Complaint. 
JUDGMENT 
Based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters 
summary judgment against Mr. Henderson as to Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five 
and Six of the OPC's Complaint. A sanction hearing will be held on January 30, 2006 
beginning at 2:00 p.m. 
<b day of \ ^ $ W 2 Entered this W  of __AXNXwm>2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Hon 
Third Ju 
c I S~l * I 
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Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline of:: RULING AND ORDER RE: SANCTIONS 
J. KEITH HENDERSON, #01459, : CASE NO. 040903585 
Respondent. : 
The first part of this bifurcated matter was tried before the Court 
on November 25, 2005. The Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") was 
represented by counsel, Diane K. Akiyama. The respondent was personally 
present and was represented by counsel, John T. Caine. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on December 13, 
2005. 
The Court found that Mr. Henderson had violated several Rules of 
Professional Conduct, to wit: Rules 1.1 (Competence); 1.4 
(Communication); 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation; 3.3 
(Candor Toward the Tribunal); and 8.4 §§ (a) and (d) (Misconduct). 
After the Court entered its Findings and Conclusions, the Court 
commenced the sanctions hearing on January 30, 2006, the date agreed to 
by the parties. 
The respondent was present and represented by Mr. Caine and the OPC 
was represented by Ms. Akiyama. 
Testimony was taken, with witnesses appearing for both sides. The 
Court having considered the testimony, exhibits, Memoranda and arguments, 
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HENDERSON MATTER PAGE 2 RULING 
now enters the following Ruling and Order imposing sanctions upon Mr. 
Henderson as a result of the violations previously adjudicated. 
Pursuant to the Standards: "A disciplinary sanction is imposed on 
a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that the lawyer had engaged in 
professional misconduct." Rule 2.1. As indicated above, in this case 
the determination of violations is based on this Court's Findings and 
Conclusions, and not on any acknowledgment by Mr. Henderson. 
The factors the Court must consider in imposing sanctions are set 
forth in Rule 3.1. They are: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's 
mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
The Court believes that these factors, in the order stated, are a useful 
framework for consideration of the appropriate sanction in this case: 
DUTIES VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENT 
Mr. Henderson violated numerous duties to his client, the Court and 
legal system, the public, and to the profession. 
Duties to clients: Mr. Henderson violated duties to his client 
with respect to competence, communication, and termination of 
representation. Mr. Henderson lacked the thoroughness reasonably 
necessary by filing a claim with the Labor Commission prior to 
ascertaining the status of Mr. Blakley's personal injury case. 
Mr. Henderson also violated his duty to Mr. Blakley by failing to 
fully explain the impact of the personal injury settlement, his 
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HENDERSON MATTER PAGE 3 RULING 
suspension from practice on the worker's compensation matter and to 
protect the client's interests upon his withdrawal of the representation. 
Duties to the Court and legal system: An attorney violates his 
duty to the Court and the legal system when he submits misleading 
information to a tribunal. Mr. Henderson violated his duty to the legal 
system by knowingly misrepresenting to the Administrative Law Judge that 
the worker's compensation case had settled when in fact it had not. He 
also violated his duty by failing to timely file his withdrawal with the 
Labor Commission and comply with the tribunal's orders. 
Duties to the public: Mr. Henderson violated his duty to the public 
by failing to abide by the procedural requirements of withdrawing from 
the representation and by making a misrepresentation to the tribunal. 
These actions violated his duty to the public to maintain the standard 
of personal integrity. 
Duties to the profession: His misrepresentation to the tribunal 
violated Mr. Henderson's duty to the profession. As noted in the trial 
brief of the OPC, truth and candor are synonymous with justice, and 
honesty is an implicit characteristic of the legal profession. Mr. 
Henderson's failure to promptly withdraw as required and later directed 
by the ALJ also violated his duty to the profession. 
MENTAL STATE OF THE RESPONDENT 
Three mental states (intent, knowledge, and negligence) may be 
considered pursuant to the Standards, and the determination of which 
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HENDERSON MATTER PAGE 4 RULING 
applies has a significant bearing on the presumptive sanction for the 
violation(s), as does the injury factor. The three mental states are 
defined in the Standards, as follows: 
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish 
a particular result. 
"Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or 
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the 
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result. 
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial 
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, 
which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. 
As pointed out in the brief of the OPC, Courts ought to evaluate the 
attorney's mental state based upon the facts and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
Since the Court has already determined that Mr. Henderson violated 
Rule 3.3(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court can infer 
that Mr. Henderson's mental state of mind was intentional. The Court can 
also infer that Mr. Henderson acted intentionally, or at least knowingly, 
when he failed to comply with the tribunal's order to file a Withdrawal 
of Counsel. Mr. Henderson knew he was required to inform all courts, 
opposing counsel, and clients that he had been suspended from the 
practice of law. Even after being directly ordered by the ALJ to file 
his Withdrawal of Counsel, Mr. Henderson did not file his Withdrawal 
until October 15, 2002, after he received the Bar Complaint. See, 
Findings at 4-5, Nos. 24-25. 
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HENDERSON MATTER PAGE 5 RULING 
It can also be inferred that Mr. Henderson acted knowingly when he 
failed to adequately determine the status of Mr. Blakley's personal 
injury suit and communicate with Mr. Blakley. Mr. Henderson knew Mr. 
Blakley was pursuing a third party claim against the driver in the 
accident that was the basis of the worker's compensation claims. See, 
Findings at 2, Nos. 3-7. 
ACTUAL AND/OR POTENTIAL INJURY CAUSED BY THE RESPONDENT 
Utah's Standards provide that ''injury is harm to a client, the 
public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a lawyer's 
misconduct...." "Potential injury is the harm to a client, the public, 
the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the 
time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening 
factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's 
misconduct." Definitions, Standards. 
Mr. Henderson caused potential harm to his client due to his lack 
of competence and communication. Mr. Blakley might not have chosen to 
pursue the worker's compensation claim had he been aware of the effect 
the personal injury settlement would have had on his claims. Mr. 
Henderson's failure to properly withdraw could have also harmed his 
client's case. 
Mr. Henderson caused actual harm to the Court and the legal system 
when he failed to comply with the withdrawal of counsel procedural 
requirements and the Order of Suspension, and later the ALJ's Order to 
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file a withdrawal. The tribunal and opposing party incurred additional 
time and expense to continue the hearing due to Mr. Henderson's failure 
to properly withdraw. 
The profession and the legal system were also at least potentially 
harmed by Mr. Henderson's misleading conduct. Honest conduct by officers 
of the court is key to the maintenance of public trust in the profession 
and the- legal system. 
PRESUMPTIVE SANCTION 
The Standards set forth presumptive sanctions for broad categories 
of misconduct, absent the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances. See, Rule 4, Standards. Pursuant to the Standards: 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engaged in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d) , (e) or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes interference or 
potential interference with a legal proceedings; or 
(b) engaged in criminal conduct that does not contain the 
elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 4.3, Standards. Mr. Henderson's misconduct falls within the ambit 
of subsection (a) based upon his knowing misconduct in violation of Rule 
8.4(a). 
As noted in the Findings of Fact, previously made by the Court, Mr. 
Henderson failed to notify Mr. Blakley that he had been suspended, that 
he failed to notify Mr. Blakley of a pending hearing and failed to return 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HENDERSON MATTER PAGE 7 RULING 
Mr. Blakley's file when he did withdraw, which withdrawal was nearly 20 
months after being directed to do so. 
Mr. Henderson failed to comply with the previous suspension Order 
despite filing an Affidavit indicating he had complied. He also made a 
misrepresentation to a tribunal and failed to inform the Court of his 
suspension even after being ordered to file a Notice of Withdrawal within 
ten days. 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
Rule 6 (of the Standards) provides for the adjustment of the 
presumptive discipline according to mitigating and aggravating factors. 
A. Prior Record of Discipline 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor a respondent's 
prior record of discipline. See, Rule 6.2(a), Standards. Mr. Henderson 
has a record of discipline in the form of a suspension imposed in 2000 
and other discipline imposed in 1988 and 1997. Further, Mr. Henderson 
was suspended in part for similar violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct including, failing to provide competent representation, failing 
to communicate with clients, missing a court hearing and filing a false 
Affidavit. 
B. Dishonest or Selfish Motive 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor a respondent's 
dishonest or selfish motive. See, Rule 6.2(b), Standards. The OPC 
argues that Mr. Henderson's actions demonstrate a selfish motive when he 
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failed to send and file the required notices to all parties in Mr. 
Blakley's case that he had been suspended from the practice of law. As 
a result of the action, Mr. Henderson failed to fully inform Mr. Blakley 
of what needed to be done next, misled the tribunal about why he had 
withdrawn from the representation and failed to timely file a Notice of 
Withdrawal despite being ordered to do so within ten days. See, Findings 
at 4-5, Nos. 16-25. 
C. Multiple Offenses 
The Standards recognize multiple offenses as an aggravating factor. 
See, Rule 6.2(d), Standards. Mr. Henderson's five violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct constitute multiple offenses within the 
meaning of the Standards. 
D. Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor "obstruction of the 
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or 
orders of the disciplinary authority." Rule 6.2(e), Standards. 
Mr. Henderson obstructed the disciplinary proceedings in this court, 
which is now the disciplinary authority, by failing to comply with the 
rules and the Case Management Order of this Court. Mr. Henderson filed 
his Answer late, despite OPC's repeated agreements to give Mr. Henderson 
until May 26, 2004, before it raised the matter with the Court and he 
delayed the filing of the Stipulated Discovery Plan in this matter. See, 
Reply to Respondent's Response to Utah State Bar's Office of Professional 
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Conduct's Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to the Case Management 
Order, Mr. Henderson's initial disclosures were due to the OPC by August 
16, 2004, but Mr. Henderson failed to provide OPC his initial 
disclosures. Further, the OPC served by mail discovery requests on Mr. 
Henderson on December 27, 2004, but he did not respond to the OPC's 
discovery requests within the 3 0 day period required by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. See, Findings at 5, 26-27. 
E. Refusal to Acknowledge the Wrongful Nature of the Misconduct 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor respondent's 
''refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct involved, 
either to the client or to the disciplinary authority." Rule 6.2(g), 
Standards. Mr. Henderson has not acknowledged the wrongful nature of his 
misconduct. In fact, at the sanction hearing, he argued that he had done 
nothing wrong in relation to the Blakley case. 
F. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor the "substantial 
experience in the practice of law." Rule 6.2 (i) . Mr. Henderson has been 
a member of the Utah State Bar since April 20, 1971. More experience 
beyond his 2 9 years of experience would not have taught Mr. Henderson 
more than he already knew about competent preparation and communication 
with his client. 
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G. Lack of Good Faith Effort to Rectify the Consequences 
The Standards recognize as an aggravating factor a respondent's 
"lack of good faith effort to...rectify the consequences of the 
misconduct involved." Rule 6.2 (j), Standards. Mr. Henderson failed to 
make a good faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct 
in this matter. After failing to file his Withdrawal of Counsel, the ALJ 
directed Mr. Henderson to file his Withdrawal within ten days, but Mr. 
Henderson disregarded the Order for more than a year and a half. See, 
Findings at 4-5, Nos. 24-25. He did not file his Withdrawal of Counsel 
until after a Bar Complaint was filed by Mr. Blakley in this matter. 
Further, Mr. Henderson never corrected the misrepresentation he made to 
the tribunal when he filed his Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, nor did 
he correct his inaccurate Affidavit in the disciplinary suspension case. 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
Rule 63 provides a list of mitigating circumstances to be considered 
by the Court. 
The respondent raises two of the factors listed in the Rule in 
mitigation. 
First, respondent's counsel argues that nothing in the record 
establishes dishonesty or selfishness. His position is that the 
respondent gained nothing from his actions, did not have a financial 
benefit and that suspension should be reserved for attorneys who 
misappropriate client funds or are convicted of a felony. 
• 
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This Court does not find that to be the standard to apply. Mr. 
Henderson lied to the tribunal and deceived his client, the tribunal, and 
opposing attorney by omitting the fact of his suspension. These actions 
are both dishonest and selfish. 
Second, he presents evidence of good character from a practitioner 
in the same field. This evidence was challenged by an OPC witness who 
testified that he reported the respondent to the Bar because of his 
actions. 
SUMMARY 
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
addressed above, the Court determines that there is no basis for a lesser 
sanction than the suspension presumed by the Standards. 
The OPC argues for a suspension of three years or at the least, six 
months. The respondent argues for a public reprimand. 
The problem with the respondent's suggestion is that there is no 
evidence before the Court to mitigate the presumptive sanction. The 
argument that if respondent had been able to present his case, suspension 
would not be the appropriate sanction is too late. The fact of the 
respondent's acts coupled with his neglect has resulted in his 
suspension. The fact that his previous suspension was for similar 
actions leads the Court to believe he has not learned from the minimum 
suspension. 
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With the foregoing in mind, and consistent with the Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as addressed in detail herein, the Court now 
makes and enters its following: 
ORDER/ suspending respondent J. Keith Henderson from the practice 
of law in the State of Utah for a period of twelve months, effective 
March 8, 2006, pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability. 
The Court is imposing the entire twelve months' suspension, but Mr. 
Henderson is hereby granted leave to petition the Court to stay all but 
three months of the suspension, on the following conditions: That Mr. 
Henderson, at his expense, retain an experienced member of the Utah State 
Bar who is generally experienced in litigation to act as supervisor and 
mentor for a period of up to nine months. The supervision shall include 
one-on-one counseling regarding practice matters, review of files, 
participation in court and discovery procedures, review of documents 
prepared by Mr. Henderson, including specifically correspondence to 
opposing counsel, and review of all aspects of Mr. Henderson's practice. 
It is anticipated that the lawyer selected and who must be approved by 
this Court shall spend approximately five hours per week with Mr. 
Henderson (as an average), for up to nine months, but the specific time 
shall ultimately be at the discretion of the supervising lawyer and at 
a rate of compensation to be agreed between Mr. Henderson and the lawyer. 
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If Mr. Henderson chooses not to petition for a stay, he shall serve the 
full suspension. 
At the end of the suspension period, Mr. Henderson may petition for 
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability. 
The Court intends that this Ruling and Order shall be the final 
Order of the Court, but either the OPC or Mr. Henderson may request the 
Court for any modification or clarification that either may think 
necessary to comply with all applicable Rules or to effect the Court's 
purposes set forth herein. 
Dated this jll daY o f February, 2006. 
L.A. D 
DISTRICT COURT 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions, to the following, this \0~~ 
day of February, 2006: 
Diane Akiyama 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John T. Caine 
Attorney for Respondent 
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
MOSQ^ 
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Charles A. Gruber, #7391 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
UTAH STATE BAR 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
KEITH J. HENDERSON, #1459 
Respondent. 
I FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
I ORDER OF SUSPENSION AND 
I PROBATION 
CIVIL NO. 990910496 
I JUDGE: Sandra N. Peuler 
This matter was tried before the Court on September 26 and 27, 2000. The 
Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by counsel, Charles A. Gruber. 
The respondent was personally present and was represented by counsel, Gregory G. 
Skordas. At the conclusion of trial, the Court took this matter under advisement and now 
issues its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
F& s r**cr count 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The respondent is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah 
for approximately 30 years. 
Stanley and Susan Spooner Complaint 
2. In 1993, Stanley and Susan Spooner retained the respondent to represent 
them in a bankruptcy matter. The main purpose of the bankruptcy filing was to 
discharge tax debts for which the Spooners were being garnished. The respondent filed 
the bankruptcy action too early to be able to discharge all of the Spooners' taxes. 
Therefore, one year of taxes was not discharged. The Spooners thereafter continued to 
be garnished by the I.R.S. for the one year of tax debt that was not discharged. 
3. During the bankruptcy proceedings, the respondent represented Susan 
Spooner against Stanley Spooner in a divorce action. Although the respondent testified 
that Stanley Spooner waived any conflict, the respondent did not obtain a written waiver 
and in the divorce decree Stanley Spooner was ordered to reimburse Susan Spooner 
for the tax debts which had been the subject of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
4. The Spooners sued respondent for malpractice and were awarded a 
Judgment in the sum of approximately $11,000. During the course of the malpractice 
litigation, the respondent filed an Affidavit in opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment in which respondent alleged that the clients, themselves, made the decision 
2 
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to file the bankruptcy case early. During the course of the same litigation at a later 
deposition, the respondent admitted that he had made the error in the filing date. 
5. Judgment was entered against respondent in approximately June, 1997. 
On August 10, 1999, respondent paid the Judgment, plus interest, in the sum of 
$12,500. 
6. The Spooners filed a Complaint against respondent with the Bar in 
October, 1995. On September 30, 1996, the OPC sent a letter to respondent seeking 
information regarding the Spooners' Complaint. The OPC sent a total of seven letters 
to respondent before respondent replied to the Bar's request for information in July, 
1998. 
Richard B. Robinson Complaint 
7. The OPC received a Complaint from Richard B. Robinson regarding 
respondent's representation of him on March 19, 1997. The Bar first requested 
information from respondent in a letter dated March 27, 1997. Respondent filed a 
response to their request July 27, 1997. The Bar thereafter filed an informal Complaint 
against respondent October 25, 1998. 
8. Richard Robinson failed to appear at the trial to testify regarding the 
substance of his Complaint. 
3 
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Lewis and Marie Henderson Complaint 
9. Lewis and Marie Henderson filed a Complaint against respondent with the 
OPC on April 3, 1997. On June 11, 1997, the OPC sent a letter to respondent seeking 
information regarding the above Complaint. The OPC sent five letters to respondent 
before respondent replied to the Bar's request on July 31, 1998. Lewis and Marie 
Henderson failed to appear at the trial regarding the substance of their Complaint 
against respondent. 
Larry N. Jenkins Complaint 
10. Larry N. Jenkins filed a Complaint with the OPC on May 7, 1997. The Bar 
sent a letter to respondent June 11,1997, seeking information and a written response to 
Jenkins' allegations. A total of six letters were sent to respondent before he replied on 
July 30, 1998. Larry Jenkins failed to appear at the trial to testify regarding the 
substance of his Complaint against respondent. 
Lance L. Miller Complaint 
11. Lance L. Miller contacted respondent in March, 1997, regarding a wage 
claim based upon his termination from employment. Miller paid the respondent a 
retainer of $204. Miller expected respondent to file his wage claim, but respondent did 
not. Respondent testified that he had declined to represent Miller, although he 
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acknowledged that the statute of limitations provided only a 60 day period within which 
to file a claim. 
12. Respondent took no action to protect Miller from losing his wage claim due 
to the statute of limitations and also refused to return the retainer. Respondent also 
failed to return Miller's phone calls. 
13. Miller brought an action against respondent in Small Claims Court seeking 
the amount of his wage claim, approximately $3,100, and the amount of the retainer, 
$204. Ultimately, Judgment was entered against respondent only for the retainer. 
14. After the time ran for appeal, respondent paid Miller the retainer. 
15. Miller filed a Complaint against respondent on May 28, 1997. The Bar 
requested information and a response from the respondent in a letter dated June 10, 
1997. The Bar sent six letters to respondent, but respondent never complied with the 
requests made in the letters. 
Michael R, Dick Complaint 
16. From March, 1997 through July, 1997, the respondent represented 
Michael R. Dick regarding a worker's compensation claim. During the four month period 
Dick called respondent approximately 30 times, and the respondent called back only 
two or three times. 
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17. At the end of March and again at the end of April, respondent assured 
Dick that respondent's office was working on his file. Toward the end of April, 
respondent said that Dick's file was "getting big." In July, 1997, respondent met with 
Dick, at which time Dick saw his file. The file contained only the same three or four 
papers Dick had given him months earlier, but nothing else. Respondent testified that 
he had wanted to delay his client's independent medical examination, so that he could, 
ultimately, obtain more funds for his client. The delay, however, was not in accordance 
with the client's wishes. Respondent also testified that he attempted to have his client 
at Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry. Respondent provided no documentation, 
however, of any work done in the case. 
18. Thereafter, Dick sent a letter firing respondent. After Dick's new attorney 
requested his file, respondent took three months to deliver the same. 
19. Dick filed a Complaint against respondent with the Bar on July 23, 1997. 
On August 18, 1997, the OPC sent a letter to respondent requesting information and a 
response. The respondent thereafter failed to reply. 
Michael Chouinard Complaint 
20. In December, 1996, Michael Chouinard retained respondent regarding a 
worker's compensation matter. In January, 1997, Chouinard filled out and signed a 
form requested by the respondent. During the period of time from January through 
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May, 1997, Chouinard telephoned respondent from Chouinard's home in Idaho 50 or 
more times. The respondent only spoke with Chouinard personally once or twice. 
During this period of time, respondent advised Chouinard that the application for 
hearing had been filed with the Industrial Commission. Chouinard thereafter contacted 
the Industrial Commission and learned that the forms had not been filed. Respondent, 
upon being contacted, acknowledged that his secretary had forgotten to file it, but that 
he would do it immediately. 
21. During the summer of 1997, Chouinard again learned that the application 
for hearing had not been filed. Chouinard called respondent five times per day, every 
day, but could never get through to respondent. Respondent sent a letter to Chouinard, 
dated September 24, 1997, indicating that the application for hearing had been filed. 
However, the application for hearing was not filed until October 8, 1997. The respondent 
explained that he had "submitted it for filing," which is not credible, based on the time 
between the two events. 
22. Respondent testified that he arranged for a psychiatric evaluation for 
Chouinard due to the client's complaint of headaches. Respondent provided no 
documentation of any work on Chouinard's claim, however. 
23. Chouinard testified that he requested his file when he fired respondent in 
February, 1998, and that he did not receive all of his documents back. The respondent 
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mailed documents to Chouinard's Washington attorney and then received a second 
request from an attorney in Provo. No evidence was provided as to the time period that 
elapsed between the request for documents and respondent's mailing to counsel in 
Washington. 
24. Chouinard filed a Complaint against respondent with the Bar September 
18, 1997. The OPC requested information and a response 
on September 23, 1997. The OPC sent a total of five letters to respondent before he 
filed a reply on July 29, 1998. 
James Franklin Complaint 
25. In January, 1997, James Franklin retained respondent to represent him in 
a criminal matter. In February, 1997, Franklin's home was searched and various 
personal property seized by the State. In May, 1997, Franklin was served with a 
forfeiture Complaint. Respondent appeared with Franklin on the criminal matter, but did 
no work in the civil forfeiture action. 
26. Franklin testified that respondent had agreed to represent him in the civil 
forfeiture case, although respondent denied that. Additionally, Franklin paid no retainer 
or other monies to respondent for representation in the civil case. 
27. The Court allowed respondent to withdraw from representation in the 
criminal matter and appointed the Legal Defenders Office to represent Franklin. 
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Franklin testified that he failed to appear on numerous occasions in the criminal matter 
because respondent intentionally told him to appear on the wrong dates. Franklin 
inissed numerous court dates over a period of time from May 23, 1997, until the case 
was completed August 15, 2000. Several of Franklins' failures to appear occurred after 
respondent was allowed to withdraw. 
28. The property seized in the civil forfeiture action had a value of 
approximately $30,000. Judgment was entered against Franklin in the civil forfeiture 
case based upon a failure to respond. Franklin thereafter attempted to represent 
himself in setting aside the Default Judgment, which was unsuccessful. Franklin has 
pot received the property or any funds representing the value of the property. 
29. Franklin filed a Complaint with the OPC on August 20, 1998. The Bar sent 
a letter to respondent September 1, 1998, seeking information and a response 
regarding that Complaint. Respondent replied to the Bar's request September 14, 
1998. 
Diane Jones Complaint 
30. Attorney Diane Jones represented a plaintiff in a divorce action in which 
the respondent was opposing counsel in 1996 (Trevino v. Trevino). 
31. In December, 1996, respondent failed to appear at a pretrial conference 
held before the Commissioner. Jones telephoned respondent, who had failed to 
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calendar the pretrial, and respondent thereafter appeared late for the pretrial 
conference. 
32. In March, 1997, respondent failed to appear at a pretrial conference with 
the Judge. The pretrial conference had been scheduled and noticed to both counsel by 
the court. Respondent did not appear because he was not able to resolve the case by 
stipulation and anticipated Jones would simply obtain a trial setting. The Judge 
awarded attorney's fees to Jones from respondent as a result of his failure to appear at 
the court hearing. Respondent failed to pay the attorney's fees awarded until 
September, 1998. 
33. The respondent had difficulty communicating with his client from the time 
the Complaint was filed August, 1996, until the case was resolved approximately one 
year later based upon his client's incarceration in California. Jones' client had to leave 
her job three times to appear in court for the various proceedings. The case was 
delayed based upon respondent's inability to communicate with his client, respondent's 
failure to appear at court proceedings, and his failure to communicate with attorney 
Jones. 
34. On May 12, 1998, Jones filed a Complaint against respondent with the 
OPC. The OPC mailed a letter to respondent July 29, 2000, requesting information and 
a response regarding the allegations. The respondent thereafter failed to reply. 
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Guadalupe Trevino Complaint 
35. The respondent represented Guadalupe Trevino in a divorce action filed 
by Ms. Jones in August, 1996. On September 9, 1997, Trevino filed a Complaint 
against the respondent with the OPC. The OPC sent five letters to respondent before 
he replied to the Bar's request on July 14, 1998. The Bar's first letter was sent 
September 17, 1997. Trevino failed to appear at trial to testify concerning the 
substance of his Complaint. Jones testified that at the December pretrial, respondent 
acknowledged he had had no contact with his client. Respondent testified, as noted 
above, that based upon Trevino's incarceration in California, that communication was 
difficult. 
Ranae Johnson Complaint 
36. In 1996, Ranae Johnson retained respondent to represent her in an action 
against her employer. On October 16, 1998, Johnson filed a Complaint 
against respondent with the OPC. The OPC sent a letter to respondent 
November 16, 1998, requesting information regarding the Complaint filed 
against respondent by Johnson. Respondent thereafter failed to reply to 
the Bar's request. Johnson failed to appear at the trial to testify regarding 
the substance of her Complaint against respondent. 
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Katrina Rose Complaint 
37. In 1987, Katrina Rose retained respondent to represent her in a divorce 
action. On December 14, 1998, Rose filed a Complaint against respondent with the 
OPC. On January 11, 1999, the OPC sent a letter to respondent regarding the 
Complaint and seeking information and a response. The respondent thereafter failed to 
reply to the OPC's request. Rose failed to appear at the trial to 
testify concerning the substance of her Complaint against respondent. 
Based upon the above findings of fact, the Court now enters the following 
conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As to the Spooner Complaint, the respondent has violated Rule 1.1 in that 
his filing date on the bankruptcy was erroneous, Rule 1.7 as to the representation of 
Susan Spooner, which adversely affected Stanley Spooner regarding disposition of 
debts, Rule 8.4 regarding respondent's filing a false Affidavit in the civil lawsuit brought 
by the Spooners, and Rule 8.1 related to respondent's failure to comply with the OPC's 
request for information. 
2. As to the Miller Complaint, respondent violated Rule 1.3 regarding his 
failure to file Miller's Complaint in a timely manner or counseling Miller about the need to 
file before the statute of limitations ran, Rule 1.3 relative to respondent's failure to return 
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Miller's phone calls, and Rule 8.1 regarding his failure to comply with the Bar's request 
for information. 
3. As to the Dick Complaint, respondent violated Rule 1.3 in that respondent 
undertook no work on Dick's Complaint during the four month period of his 
representation, Rule 1.4 based upon respondent's failure to communicate appropriately 
with his client, Rule 3.2 for his failure to expedite the client's cause of action, and Rule 
8.1 regarding respondent's failure to comply with the Bar's request for information. 
4. As to the Chouinard Complaint, respondent violated Rule 1.3 based upon 
respondent's failure to file the client's application for hearing for a period of 
approximately ten months, Rule 1.4 for respondent's failure to appropriately 
communicate with his client and keep his client advised as to the status of the matter, 
Rule 3.2 for failure to expedite the client's cause of action, Rule 8.1 for respondent's 
failure to comply with the Bar's request for information, and Rule 8.4(d) for 
misrepresenting the status of the application to his client. 
5. As to the Franklin Complaint, no Rules of Professional Conduct were 
violated by respondent. This is based upon the Court's assessment of Franklin's 
credibility. Franklin, for example, testified that he failed to appear on numerous 
occasions in the criminal matter because respondent deliberately provided him with 
incorrect dates. That testimony is contrary to respondent's testimony, as well as all 
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other evidence the Court received in this case. In addition, the Court notes the 
inconsistencies as to retainers paid to respondent. In the criminal case, Franklin 
testified that he paid respondent a retainer fee. In the civil case, however, Franklin 
testified he had paid nothing. Based upon the inconsistencies in Franklin's dealings 
with respondent in the two cases, as well as his lack of credibility, the Court concludes 
that respondent's testimony that he never represented Franklin in the civil case is 
credible and accurate. Therefore, none of the actions or inactions of respondent 
relative to the civil matter are a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
6. As to the Diane Jones Complaint, the respondent violated Rule 3.2 based 
upon his failure to expedite the divorce matter, Rule 3.4 in that respondent failed to 
appear at the Court ordered pretrial conference, thereby causing opposing counsel and 
her client to appear without being able to take any action, and Rule 8.1 for his failure to 
respond to the Bar's request for information relative to the Jones Complaint. 
7. As to the Guadalupe Trevino Complaint, the Lewis and Marie Henderson 
Complaint, the Larry Jenkins Complaint, the Ranae Johnson Complaint, and the Katrina 
Rose Complaint, the respondent violated Rule 8.1 based upon his failure to respond in 
a timely manner to the Bar's request for information regarding the substance of the 
Complaints. Based upon the complainants' failures to appear at trial, all other 
allegations raised by these complainants in these causes of action are dismissed. 
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8. As to the Richard Robinson Complaint, the Court concludes that 
respondent violated no Rules of Professional Conduct. The complainant failed to 
appear at the trial, and therefore the substance of his Complaint is dismissed. In 
addition to that, it appears that respondent promptly responded to the Bar's request for 
information regarding that Complaint. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING SANCTIONS 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to the 
respondent's violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court now enters the 
following Decision with regard to sanctions. 
1. Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 
generally the following factors should be considered: (a) the duty violated; (b) the 
lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
2. The specific duties violated by respondent essentially fall into five 
separate categories. In four cases, respondent failed to timely file his clients' petitions. 
In the Spooner case, he erroneously filed the bankruptcy petition too soon. In three 
other cases, he filed applications for hearing late, or not at all. 
3. The second area of specific duties violated by respondent are ten 
separate instances of failures to respond to the Bar's request for information upon 
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Complaints being filed. In each of these ten cases, respondent either failed to respond 
to the Bar at all, or responded only after numerous letters had been sent over a period 
of months. 
4. The third area of specific duty violated by respondent are three separate 
instances of respondent's failure to communicate with a client and keep the client 
advised of the status of the matter. 
5. In addition, in one case, respondent violated his duty of loyalty to a client 
by representing one of his clients against the other. Respondent also failed to appear in 
one case at a Court ordered hearing. 
6. As to the lawyer's mental state, the only evidence submitted to the Court 
was respondent's testimony, which included his statement that he would become 
irritated when a client or former client would file a Complaint against him, and that 
during this time he had buried his head in the sand. 
7. As to potential or actual injury caused by respondent's conduct, 
respondent caused actual injury to the Spooners in failing to properly calculate the time 
at which their bankruptcy petition should be filed. The actual harm caused was the 
continued garnishment of the Spooners by the I.R.S. for the tax debt that was not 
discharged. Respondent also caused actual harm to Stanley Spooner against whom 
respondent represented Susan Spooner in the divorce action, at the same time the 
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bankruptcy action was pending. In the divorce action, Stanley Spooner was ordered to 
pay the marital debts, which included the I.R.S. debt. 
8. In addition, respondent caused actual harm to Lance L. Miller, whose 
cause of action on a wage claim was lost because the statute of limitations was allowed 
to expire. Respondent also caused potential injury in the sum of the retainer he 
charged, $204. Miller obtained this amount from respondent at a subsequent time 
based upon a small claims action that Miller filed against respondent. 
9. Respondent also caused potential harm to Michael R. Dick and Michael 
Chouinard, whose worker's compensation claims respondent failed to timely file. Their 
subsequent attorneys were able to resolve the matters and both thereafter received 
funds from their claims. 
10. Finally, respondent caused both potential and actual injury to the public, 
the legal system and the profession by first failing to appear at a Court ordered pretrial 
conference, and by failing and refusing to respond to the Bar's request for information 
relative to ten separate Complaints. 
11. As to aggravating factors, the Court finds as follows: 
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(a) Prior record of discipline. Respondent has a prior record of 
discipline beginning 1987, and concluding in November, 1997. The majority of those 
matters fell between August, 1988 and August, 1992, and involved cautions, 
admonitions and private reprimands. Included in those are an April, 1989, admonition 
for failure to communicate with a client, and February, 1991, an admonition for failure to 
respond to the Bar's request for information relative to a Complaint. 
(b) Pattern of misconduct. The Complaints filed in this matter and 
heard by the Court include numerous failures to communicate with clients, to timely file 
matters, and to respond to the Bar. 
(c) Multiple offenses. Twelve separate Complaints were filed in this 
matter. Ten of those were substantiated, either in part or in whole. 
(d) Obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to 
comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary authority. Respondent failed and 
refused to respond to the Bar's repeated requests for information in ten separate cases. 
(e) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct 
involved, either to the client or the disciplinary authority. Respondent testified that he 
believed he had done nothing wrong, except for his failure to respond to the Bar's 
requests for information. Numerous witnesses testified that respondent had never 
acknowledged any wrongdoing or apologized for his actions or inactions relative to their 
cases. 
(f) Substantial experience in the practice of law. As noted above, 
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respondent has practiced law for approximately 30 years. 
(g) Lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved. On two separate occasions, respondent 
required a Judgment to be entered against him before any restitution was paid to a 
client. 
12. As to mitigating circumstances, the Court finds as follows: 
(a) Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. There is no evidence that 
any of respondent's actions or failure to act were based upon dishonest or selfish 
motives. In fact, none of the duties that he violated appeared to benefit him in any 
manner. 
(b) Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. In the Spooner and Miller cases, 
respondent was ordered to repay the clients for their losses. He has actually paid 
those amounts in the sum of over $12,000. 
(c) Remoteness of prior offenses. The respondent's prior disciplinary 
history includes one admonition in 1997 for practicing law after failing to pay his Bar 
dues in a timely manner. With the exception of that admonition, all of his other 
sanctions occurred from 1987 through August, 1992. As noted above, respondent has 
been practicing law for approximately 30 years. There is no evidence of any prior 
discipline before 1987, and there was a period of a number of years after August, 1992, 
before further proceedings were filed against him. 
(d) Time period of these Complaints. With the exception of the Rose and 
Z:\HENDERSN\FORMAL\PLEAD\FOF-COL-ORDSUSP-PR0B.doc 19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Spooner cases in which respondent represented the claimant in 1987 and 1993, all of 
the other Complaints filed in this action resulted from respondent's representation of 
clients from September, 1996, through July, 1997. It appears, then, that there were a 
number of Complaints filed against respondent, but during a fairly brief period of time. 
As noted above, respondent had had no Bar Complaints filed for a period of 
approximately four years before these Complaints were filed. 
13. In determining appropriate sanctions, suspension is generally appropriate 
when the lawyer's misconduct is knowing, while reprimand is generally appropriate 
when the lawyer's misconduct is negligent. The Court finds that the respondent's 
misconduct as to failure to appear at a Court ordered hearing and failure to respond to 
the Bar were actions taken knowingly. As to the first, the pretrial hearing was noticed to 
both counsel by the Court with a directive that counsel appear. Respondent 
acknowledged that he knew about the Court hearing and determined not to go. His 
reason was that he would not be able to accomplish anything, because he didn't have 
his client's consent to resolve the matter. However, he made a conscious decision not 
to appear at the hearing. 
14. As to the failure to respond to the Bar, the respondent testified that he was 
aware of his obligation to respond to the Bar's requests for information relative to each 
of the Complaints filed against him. He further testified that he did not respond. The 
Court finds that the respondent knew of his obligation, and again made a conscious 
decision not to comply. 
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15. As to the remaining violations, the Court finds that those are negligent 
conduct as defined in the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
16. It appears, then, that for two areas of violations, suspension is 
presumptively appropriate, while reprimand is appropriate for the remaining violations. 
The Court further notes, however, that based upon respondent's prior discipline 
regarding his failure to communicate with his client, a more serious sanction is generally 
appropriate, based upon his knowledge that such conduct is a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. In addition, based upon respondent's experience in practicing 
law, his acknowledgment that he was aware of his duties, and his repeated violation of 
them, the aggravating factors clearly outweigh the mitigating ones. 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION AND PROBATION 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT based upon all of that, the Court Orders 
that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. 
All but six months of that period is stayed. When respondent is readmitted to practice 
after six months, he should serve an additional 18 months of probation, to be 
supervised by the OPC. 
1. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the terms and conditions of his 
probation are as follows: 
That respondent should engage the services of a supervising attorney, to be 
approved both by the OPC and the Court, who shall report as required by the OPC on a 
regular basis on respondent's office management practices. 
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Respondent shall demonstrate to the supervising attorney that there is a 
procedure for insuring that all client requests for information are responded to on a 
timely basis, a procedure for tracking filing dates, to insure that client claims are timely 
filed, and a calendaring system to insure that court appearances are met. 
2. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall complete an 
office management class approved by the OPC. 
3. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall be ordered to pay 
costs of this litigation incurred by the OPC. 
4. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall have no 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
5. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Respondent shall promptly respond 
to any requests the Bar makes for information relative to future Complaints. 
Pursuant to the Court's Motion, Counsel for the OPC has been directed to 
prepare these Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and an Order reflecting this 
Decision. 
DATED this °[ day ofJzlkom^OOO. 
BY THE COURT: /f - \ ^ ^ M ^ 
Approved as to form: proved as t 
/>. 4 
District Court Judged" 
Sandra N. Peuler fe-% ^ ^ ' ^ .{£S 
9gSkorda$, Attorney for Respondent 
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RULING AND ORDER 
RE: SANCTIONS 
CASE NOS. 010910847 
030908681 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The first phase of this bifurcated proceeding was tried to the 
Court on November 17, 18 and 19, and December 14, 2004. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on December 20, 2004. 
The' court ; found that Ms. Lang had violated' several Rules -of 
Professional Conduct, as follows: Rule 1.3 (diligence) as to the 
Elsbury and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(b) (communication) as 
to the. Elsbury, Willcut, and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(a) 
(communication) as to the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 
8.1(b) (failure to respond to the office of Professional Conduct 
regarding complaints) in the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters; 
Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
in this case during the course of a deposition) in the Kelley 
matter; and Rule 8.4(a) in all four matters, based on the findings 
of other, specific, violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
After the court entered its Findings and Conclusions, the 
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court commenced the sanctions hearing on January 13, 2005, within 
the thirty days required by Rule 11(f), Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability, but the time set aside for hearing proved 
inadequate. The sanctions phase was ultimately heard over several 
days, concluding with the last arguments on March 22, 2005. Prior 
to closing arguments, five witnesses were examined. The Office of 
Professional Conduct was represented by Kate A. Toomey, and 
respondent was represented by Andrew B. Berry. Based upon the 
testimony of the witnesses during both phases of this proceeding, 
the court's Findings and Conclusions, the arguments of counsel, and 
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and applicable case 
law, the Court now enters its following Ruling and Order imposing 
sanctions against Ms. Lang as a result of the violations previously 
adjudicated: 
Pursuant to the Standards: XNA disciplinary sanction is imposed 
on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer had 
engaged in professional misconduct." Rule 2.1. As indicated 
above, in this case the determination of violations is based on 
this court's Findings and Conclusions, and not on any 
acknowledgement by Ms. Lang. It is true that, during the course of 
the sanctions hearing, acting through counsel, Ms. Lang generally 
accepted the findings without further argument. Nevertheless, to 
the extent there was any acknowledgement, it occurred only after 
the court entered adverse findings, and such acknowledgement cannot 
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be considered in mitigation of the violations for sanctions 
purposes. 
The factors the court must consider in imposing sanctions are 
set forth in Rule 3.1. They are: (a) the duty violated; (b) the 
lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by 
the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating factors. The court believes that these factors, in the 
order stated, are a useful framework for consideration of the 
appropriate sanction (s) in this case: 
(a) The duty (duties) violated. 
The duties violated are set forth above in summary, and in 
detail in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered December 20, 2004. They will not be repeated in detail 
here, except as necessary to explain the court's Ruling and Order 
below. 
(b) The lawyer's mental stater and 
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct. 
Three mental states (intent, knowledge, and negligence) may be 
considered pursuant to the Standards, and the determination of 
which applies has a significant bearing on the presumptive sanction 
for the violation(s), as does the injury factor. The three mental 
states are defined in the Standards as follows: 
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a particular result. 
"Knowledge" (or "knowing") is the conscious awareness of the 
nature of the attendant circumstances of the conduct but without 
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result. 
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial 
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which 
failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
lawyer would exercise in the situation. 
The Standards also provide definitions for injury and 
potential injury, as follows: 
'"Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession which results from a lawyer's misconduct. The level 
of injury can range from "serious" injury to "little or no" injury; 
a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater 
than "little or no" injury. 
"Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the 
legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at 
the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some 
intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the 
lawyer's misconduct. 
The court has very carefully considered the mental state to be 
ascribed to Ms. Lang for each of the adjudicated violations, and 
the injury or potential injury resulting therefrom, if any. No one 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mental state applies to all occurrences under the facts of Ms. 
Lang's violations. The court first determines that, with the 
exception of the two violations regarding non-responsiveness to the 
OPC, none of the violations includes conduct that could fairly be 
deemed intentional. The court will now consider the mental state 
and resulting injury, if any, of each violation, by complainant: 
In the Elsbury matter the court cannot determine that there is 
sufficient evidence to find that the initial failure to locate and 
forward income verification, etc. was knowing. It is clear; 
however, that in light of the evidence, there was a substantial 
risk that the result would follow from Ms. Lang's failure to 
carefully investigate her files and question her staff, and it was 
manifestly negligent conduct that resulted in actual injury to the 
client (the Order to Show Cause hearing regarding failure to 
produce documents as ordered) as well as potential injury, had 
Judge Henriod found contempt, which would probably have occurred 
but for the judge's active questioning at the hearing (which 
constituted an intervening factor or event). 
On the other hand, Ms. Lang's abandonment of her client at the 
hearing on Order to Show Cause, when she sought to deflect any 
blame from herself or her office, and place it on her client, was 
knowing; that is, the conduct reflected a conscious awareness of 
the facts and circumstances, but the court nevertheless does not 
find a conscious purpose to abandon or harm the client; therefore, 
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intent is not present. Finally, as to Mr. Elsbury, the court 
determines that Ms. Lang negligently failed to inform him of his 
options such that he could make appropriate decisions, particularly 
regarding representation, and that this failure created significant 
potential harm that would likely have become actual injury, but for 
Judge Henriod's insistence that Ms. Lang represent Elsbury at the 
hearing. The representation did not, in fact, substantially aid 
Mr. Elsbury, but Ms. Lang's presence helped Judge Henriod 
understand the circumstances and fairly allocate fault for the 
failure to provide documents as ordered. 
Ms. Lang's violations in the Willcut matter were primarily 
knowing. Despite Ms. Lang's testimony, the court is persuaded that 
she knew that she failed to respond to repeated requests for 
information, and that she did not keep Ms. Willcut informed 
sufficiently (with or without inquiry) to permit the client to make 
informed decisions. The unusual feature of the Willcut matter is 
that there is no evidence of actual injury, and given the 
conflicting client instructions, shifting objectives, and 
inconsistencies in Ms. Willcut's claims regarding the underlying 
facts, the court cannot determine even potential injury resulting 
from Ms. Lang's omissions. 
The Kelley matter, which resulted in the court's determination 
that Ms. Lang's conduct during the deposition of her client was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, was clearly a knowing 
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act. Ms. Lang claimed both ignorance of the rules of conducting 
depositions (based on inexperience) and misunderstanding of the 
state of the law on some specific issues. That may be so, but Ms. 
Lang was inescapably aware of the nature and circumstances of her 
conduct, as the deposition deteriorated into an unproductive and 
argumentative exercise, even if she did not consciously desire that 
result at the outset. The conduct resulted in actual harm, in that 
the deposition had to be taken again (part of the cost of which was 
ultimately borne by Ms. Lang pursuant to court order), and actual 
harm to the client (both Ms. Lang's and the opposing party), the 
legal system and the profession, both of which were cast in an 
unnecessarily bad light. 
The Burch-Knowley matter encompasses several violations. The 
failure to move the matter to a conclusion, when it could have been 
accomplished months earlier but for Ms. Lang's refusal to cooperate 
in providing minimal legitimate discovery to the other side, was a 
knowing act, but one which did not intend the resulting delay. Ms. 
Lang did intend to be obdurate, because she resented opposing 
counsel's request, but that still does not evince an intent to 
cause delay. Nevertheless, delay inevitably occurred, and Ms. Lang 
must have known of the circumstances that led to the delay. 
While Ms. Lang was engaging in conduct that created delay, she 
was knowingly not responsive to her client and she did not provide 
information, particularly between late November, 2001, and March, 
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2002, that either informed her client of the status of the matter 
or permitted the client to make decisions consistent with the 
existing circumstances. All of the foregoing violations resulted 
in actual injury to the client, primarily delay in obtaining 
increased child support, as well as injury to the profession, 
insofar as the opposing counsel was placed in an impossible 
situation with his client, resulting in a loss of confidence and 
termination before the matter concluded, and the reputation of the 
profession suffered significantly in the eyes of both parties and 
also the spouse of the child's father. 
In both the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters, the court 
further finds that the failure to respond to the OPC requests for 
information and answers to complaints was intentional. The court 
recognizes that as Ms. Lang's problems multiplied, she came to 
believe that responses were futile (in fact, she apparently clings 
to that belief to this day) , but this conscious belief only 
supports the finding that Ms. Lang accordingly made a conscious 
decision to not respond. 
Finally, the court has not addressed the inevitable findings 
of violations of Rule 8.4(a), which follow from the findings of 
other, more specific, misconduct. The court believes that it is 
not necessary to assign a mental state to these violations, but if 
one is required, in each instance the mental state should comport 
with the mental state assigned to the underlying misconduct. 
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In summary, the court finds that failure to respond to the OPC 
was intentional, most of the remaining violations were knowing, but 
some were merely negligent, as set forth in detail above. In all 
but the Willcut matter, the violations created both actual or 
potential injury, and the existence of actual injury predominates. 
The court has found all three mental states, ranging from 
intentional (but only for the failures to respond to the OPC which, 
while important, occurred after the underlying violations), to 
negligent, but the most prevalent state is knowledge, or knowing. 
The court has also found both actual and potential injury in all 
but one matter. Accordingly, the presumptive sanction is 
suspension, and the court must now proceed to consider aggravating 
and mitigating factors that may enhance or reduce the presumptive 
sanction. 
(d) The existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
The Office of Professional Conduct argues several instances of 
aggravating conduct, and concedes some mitigation. Ms. Lang, of 
course, argues substantial mitigation, and suggests that the only 
possible aggravating factor is that there are four cases at issue, 
but she nevertheless argues that these four cases do not establish 
a pattern of misconduct. The court has carefully considered the 
arguments of both counsel, but in the interests of brevity, the 
court will address only those factors which it deems to be truly in 
controversy. 
9 
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1. Aggravating factors. 
The court will first address factors listed in the Standards, 
in the order listed, then consider any additional factors: 
- Dishonest or selfish motive. The court is persuaded that 
Ms. Lang was dishonest in her excuses proffered to Paula Willcut; 
dishonest in her blaming actions directed against opposing counsel, 
primarily Joseph Bean; and selfish in her candidly stated intent to 
protect herself at Mr. Elsbury's expense in the hearing before 
Judge Henriod. The court does not identify any other specifically 
dishonest or selfish motive or conduct. 
- Pattern of misconduct. If four cases in which violations 
are found (extending over a period of four to five years) do not 
constitute a pattern, the court is not sure what would be required. 
More to the point, the pattern is of similar misconduct, including 
failure to communicate, blaming of clients and opposing counsel, 
and refusal to accept responsibility for the lawyer's own actions. 
- Multiple offenses. See the preceding paragraph. 
- Obstruction of the disciplinary process, etc. The court's 
findings of non-responsiveness in at least two cases, and Ms. 
Lang's admission that she still believes any response and 
cooperation with the OPC to be futile establish this factor beyond 
question. 
Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct, either to the client or the disciplinary authority. 
10 
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The record fully supports such refusal to acknowledge, at least 
until after the court determined certain specific violations, and 
even then the acknowledgements were limited. The greater concern 
for the court, as will be addressed more fully below, is that even 
when Ms. Lang appears to have a will to acknowledge and address 
problems in her professional performance, she appears to lack 
critical insight into her own conduct and the'thought processes 
that have created, and to some extent, justified the conduct (that 
is, in Ms. Lang's mind). 
- Substantial experience in the practice of law. This is a 
problematic factor. Ms. Lang now has nineteen years of practice. 
She practiced ten or eleven years before the first violation, but 
it is also true that Ms. Lang had very limited experience (at least 
in 1997) in the areas of practice, and in the specific practice 
activities, involved in the violations. By 2001; however, when 
several relevant events occurred, Ms. Lang's experience was 
considerably greater, and she had focused exclusively (as she still 
does) in family law, and she should be held to the standard of an 
experienced family law practitioner with respect to at least the 
Burch-Knowley and Paula Willcut matters. 
- The foregoing are factors drawn from the Standards, but the 
court finds that the most troubling aggravating factor is Ms. 
Lang's manifest inability to understand some of the more 
fundamental issues involved in her misconduct. As will appear in 
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the mitigation section, below, the court notes and commends Ms. 
Lang for systemic changes that will undoubtedly prevent recurrence 
of some of the violations, but those violations that arise from 
lack of understanding of the advocate's role, a professional's duty 
to put the client's interests above her own, and the professional 
obligation to be candid and courteous with opposing counsel (and 
not engage in dishonest or otherwise improper blaming behavior) are 
troubling characteristics that will need more than systemic 
remedies. 
2. The existence of mitigating circumstances. 
- Absence of a prior record of discipline. There is no prior 
record, but this factor cannot be given great weight, because (1) 
Ms. Lang's practice in family law was relatively new when the first 
instance occurred, and (2) even this case, involving multiple 
violations, is a consolidation of two separate District Court 
filings. Accordingly, had the actions remained separate, at least 
the violations in the later filing would have been preceded by an 
earlier record of discipline. 
- Inexperience in the practice of law. This factor probably 
applies fairly to the Kelley matter, and to a lesser extent to the 
Elsbury matter, but not to the later violations. The court also 
notes that the inexperience of opposing counsel in the Kelley 
deposition, and her sometimes provocative conduct, are factors that 
the court weighs in considering any sanction related to that 
12 
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matter. 
- Unreasonable delay in proceedings. The court only addresses 
this factor because it was urged by Ms. Lang's counsel throughout 
the proceedings. Delay can only refer to the Kelley matter, and 
the court finds that all proceedings were timely initiated and no 
prejudice resulted to Ms. Lang from the fact that the matter was 
not ultimately adjudicated until more than seven years after the 
deposition. First, the initial delay resulted from Ms. Kelley's 
reasonable decision to delay a disciplinary complaint until the 
underlying litigation was concluded. Second, the OPC acted with 
reasonable speed and within all time limits imposed by statute and 
rule. Third, ultimate disposition was significantly delayed by Ms. 
Lang's own actions, including self-representation, dilatory 
discovery, and consolidation of cases at her request. Finally, the 
sole factual predicate was conduct during one deposition in 1997. 
All parties and the court had benefit of the transcript as a full 
record, and all attorneys present at the deposition (Ms. Lang, her 
associate, Ms. Hayes, and Ms. Kelley) testified in court, and each 
had a clear recollection of the incident; therefore, no prejudice 
was shown. 
- Interim reform. As is alluded to above, Ms. Lang has made 
substantial, and apparently effective, systemic changes. Those 
changes include a message response and documentation protocol, 
improved calendaring, and specific procedures regarding withdrawal 
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as counsel. These steps are genuine and commendable, and the court 
determines that it is unlikely that most of the communication or 
withdrawal of counsel problems will recur. The court makes this 
statement mindful of the testimony of David Lee, because even Mr. 
Lee, who is unapologetically adverse to Ms. Lang, conceded that 
she responded to all messages by at least the second request. In 
addition, Ms. Lang's billing records and her file in the Lee matter 
confirmed that messages were carefully documented and promptly 
returned. 
In addition to systemic changes, Ms. Lang has attended the OPC 
ethics school, and also attended continuing legal education 
regarding deposition practice, but as addressed in the next 
paragraph, it appears to this court that not all lessons were well 
learned. 
- Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. Ms. Lang was 
sanctioned by the trial judge for her conduct in the Kelley matter, 
and that sanction should have acted as a caution regarding conduct 
in future depositions. After reviewing the much more recent 
Marlise Smith deposition (July 21, 2004), the court is persuaded 
that some improvement has occurred, but viewed as a whole, the 
Janaka deposition (at issue in the Kelley matter) and the Marlise 
Smith deposition show a continuing failure on Ms. Lang's part to 
understand both "the rules of defending a deposition, and perhaps 
even more importantly, the rules and expectations of professional 
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civility. It appears that the trial court sanctions in the Kelley 
matter taught a very narrow lesson, at best. 
- Remorse. Ms. Lang points to her remorse, but her counsel 
had to concede that remorse delayed until trial is not a legitimate 
factor in mitigation, and that is the only remorse the court 
observed. 
SUMMARY AND ORDER 
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
addressed above, the court determines that there is no basis for a 
lesser sanction than the suspension presumed by the Standards. On 
the other hand, based on the aggravating factors, and the court's 
specific concern that beyond systemic adjustments, Ms. Lang appears 
unlikely to address the core, underlying professional failings that 
brought her to this point, disbarment might be justified and 
appropriate. In fact, as the court has wrestled with its options, 
the recurring question is just what sanction might give Ms. Lang 
the best possible chance to make fundamental changes that could 
substantially improve her prospects of practicing law until 
retirement without being plagued by continuing allegations of 
professional misconduct? 
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one 
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension. As 
already indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption 
of suspension is overcome in this case in any way that would 
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justify the lesser sanctions urged by Ms. Lang. Accordingly, the 
sanction must include suspension, but the court firmly believes 
that a suspension of six months, or even one year, without a more 
proactive component, will do anything to change Ms. Lang's 
professional conduct in the long term. There must be a term of 
actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this lawyer's 
misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a 
period of supervised practice to give Ms. Lang a chance to see how 
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of 
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other 
counsel, and the courts. 
With the foregoing in mind, and consistent with the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as addressed in detail herein, the 
court now makes and enters its following: 
ORDER, suspending respondent Marsha M. Lang from the practice 
of law in the State of Utah for a period of twelve months, 
effective May 15, 2005 (to allow winding up, pursuant to Rule 26, 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability). The court is, at this 
time, imposing the entire twelve months' suspension, but Ms. Lang 
is hereby granted leave to petition the court to stay all but three 
months of the suspension, on the following conditions: That Ms. 
Lang, at her expense, retain an experienced member of the Utah 
State Ear, who is generally experienced in litigation, and 
specifically experienced in family law, to act as supervisor and 
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mentor for a period of up to nine months. The supervision shall 
include one-on-one counseling regarding practice matters, review of 
files, participation in court and discovery procedures, review of 
documents prepared by Ms. Lang, including specifically 
correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of all aspects of 
Ms. Lang's practice. It is anticipated that the lawyer selected 
(who must be approved by this court1) shall spend approximately 
four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for up to nine 
months, but the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion 
of the supervising lawyer, and at a rate of compensation to be 
agreed between Ms. Lang and the lawyer. If Ms. Lang chooses not to 
petition for a stay, she shall serve the full suspension. 
At the end of the suspension period, Ms. Lang may petition for 
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability. 
The court intends that this Ruling and Order shall be the 
final Order of the court, but either the OPC or Ms. Lang may 
request the court for any modification or clarification that either 
may think necessary to comply with all applicable Rules or to 
1
 The court will stringently consider the qualifications of any prospective supervising lawyer. 
If Ms. Lang wishes, the court is willing to provide a list of possible candidates. These names will 
not be persons the court has contacted, but merely experienced family law practitioners in whom the 
court reposes confidence based on experience. 
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effect the court's purpose as set forth herein. 
Dated this 29th day of March, 2005. 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010910847 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
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POB 60 0 
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Mail MARY KATE A TOOMEY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 
645 S 200 E 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this ^ day of / \ > ^ , 2 0^5^-
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rvfrz^iss / ' " • Deputy Court'-Cl'erk 
1 (l-,nfl 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0FF1GE OF 
PROFESSIONALCDNDaStIS B£$T*U&"1 I S i O ' 
Kate A. Toomey, #6446 J ;- -:-'-
Deputy Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the ' 
Discipline of: 
Marsha M. Lang, #4995 
Respondent. 
I ORDER STAYING THE 
I RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION 
) AND CONCERNING THE 
) RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEME 
) TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
) UPON TERMINATION OF THE 
) PERIOD OF SUSPENSION 
I Civil No. 010910847 
) Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The matter of the Respondent's Verified Petition for Stay of Suspension 
and Imposition of Supervised Practice came on for hearing before the Court on 
July 26, 2005. The Respondent, Marsha M. Lang, was present and represented 
by Andrew Berry; the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") 
was represented by Kate A. Toomey. The Court having read the Verified 
Petition, the response filed by the OPC, and the Reply to the OPC's Response to 
Petition for Stay and Supervised Practice submitted by Ms. Lang, and being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby enter its ORDER: 
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1. The effective date of Ms. Lang's twelve-month suspension is May 
1,2005. 
2. The Court hereby stays nine months of Ms. Lang's twelve-month 
suspension, commencing August 1, 2005, upon the following conditions: 
a. During the nine-month period, Ms. Lang shall at her own 
expense retain Gary Howe to act as Ms. Lang's supervisor and mentor. 
b. The supervision shall include one-on-one counseling 
regarding practice matters, review of files, participation in court and 
discovery procedures, review of documents prepared by Ms. Lang, 
including specifically correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of 
all aspects of Ms. Lang's practice. 
c. It is anticipated that Mr. Howe shall spend approximately 
four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for nine months, but 
the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion of Mr. Howe, and at a 
rate of compensation to be agreed between Ms. Lang and Mr. Howe. 
3. The OPC shall publish notice in the next Utah Bar Journal that Ms. 
Lang's suspension has been stayed subject to the conditions identified above. 
4. Ms. Lang may petition for reinstatement to the practice of law 
pursuant to Rule 25, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), except 
that the Court hereby abates the requirement that a suspended respondent 
seeking reinstatement must pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination. 
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5. Pursuant to Rule 25(c), RLDD, Ms. Lang shall serve a copy of the 
petition for reinstatement upon the OPC, and the OPC shall publish notice of the 
petition in the Utah Bar Journal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 25(d), 
RLDD. The OPC shall also notify the complainants pursuant to Rule 25(d), 
RLDD. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 25(f), RLDD, after receiving Ms. Lang's petition for 
reinstatement, the OPC shall either advise Ms. Lang and the Court that it will 
stipulate to Ms. Lang's reinstatement or file a written objection to the petition. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 25(g), RLDD, if the OPC objects to Ms. Lang's 
petition for reinstatement, the Court will conduct a hearing on Ms. Lang's petition. 
If the OPC files no objection, the Court will review the petition without a hearing 
and enter its findings and order. 
Dated this / / " day oU&fy^ , 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ortoteblRobert K. 'Hilder 
Third Judicial District Judge / 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of , 2005, I mailed via 
United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER STAYING THE RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION AND 
CONCERNING THE RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEMENT TO THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW UPON TERMINATION OF THE PERIOD OF 
SUSPENSION to: 
Andrew Berry 
62 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
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Summary Chart of 
State Rules Governing Probation and Stayed Suspensions 
Jurisdiction 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Probation 
Rule 8(h), Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that 
probation is appropriate only in cases where there is little likelihood 
that the respondent will harm the public during the period of 
probation and where the conditions of probation can be adequately 
supervised. 
Rule 16(a)(3), Alaska Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, provides for 
probation as a sanction. 
Rule 60(a)(5)(B), Arizona Supreme Court Rules, provides that 
probation may be imposed when there is little likelihood that 
Respondent will harm the public during probation and conditions of 
probation can be adequately supervised 
Section 17.E(7), Arkansas Supreme Court Procedures of Regulating 
Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, provides that prior to or 
subsequent to the filing of a formal complaint, a panel of the 
Committee may place the lawyer on probation for a period not 
exceeding two years. Probation shall be used only in cases where 
there is little likelihood the lawyer will harm the public during the 
period of rehabilitation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised. 
Stayed Suspension I 
Not identified in rules as a sanction but are 
ordered as "other requirements that the 
Disciplinary Board deems consistent with the 
purposes of lawyer discipline." 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Does not stay suspensions based on compliance 
with conditions 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of Colombia 
Florida 
Georgia 
General Standard 1.5(e), California Standards for Attorney Sanctions 
for Professional Misconduct, addition of reasonable conditions, such 
as supervision by a probation monitor may be reasonable and 
appropriate in assessing compliance with any duties or conditions 
imposed 
Rule 251.7, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an 
attorney may be placed on probation if they can demonstrate that 
they are unlikely to harm the public during the probationary period, 
can be adequately supervised, are able to practice law without 
causing the courts and the profession to fall into disrepute, and have 
not committed acts warranting disbarment. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been 
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Rule 20, Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, 
provides for probation as a sanction. 
Rule XI, Section 3(a)(7), Rules Governing the District of Columbia 
Bar, may not be for more than three years. Imposed in lieu of or in 
addition to other sanctions. 
Rule 3-5.1(c), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Respondent may be 
placed on probation for a period not less than 6 months nor more 
than three years or for an indefinite period determined by conditions 
stated in the order. Conditions may include but are not limited to: 
completion of a practice and professionalism enhancement program, 
supervision by a member of the Florida Bar, etc. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
General Standard 1.4(c)(1), California Standards 
for Attorney Sanctions of Professional 
Misconduct, provides that an execution of a 
suspension may be stayed for a period of one to 
five years only if the stay and the performance of 
specified duties by the respondent are consistent 
with Standard 1.3, regarding protection of the 
public, courts, legal profession maintenance of 
high legal standards, etc. 
Rule 251.7 allows probation to be imposed in 
conjunction with a suspension, which may be 
stayed in whole or in part (pursuant to Rule 
251.6(b)) 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can 
and has been ordered by the Court, in its 
discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
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Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 506(c)), Idaho Bar Commission Rules, only imposed in cases 
where there is little likelihood that the defendant will harm the public 
during the probation and the probation can be adequately 
supervised. 
Rule 772, Illinois Supreme Court Rule, imposed only in cases where 
the attorney has demonstrated that he is unlikely to harm the public 
during the period of rehabilitation and the necessary conditions of 
probation can be adequately supervised. Attorney cannot have 
committed acts which warrant disbarment 
Rule 23 Section 3(c), Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the 
Discipline of Attorneys, in cases of misconduct or disability, the Court 
may, in lieu of disbarment or suspension place an attorney on 
probation and permit the attorney to continue practicing law if in its 
opinion such action is appropriate and desirable. The attorney will be 
subject to the conditions and limitations as the Court sees fit to 
impose and upon violation of such conditions the attorney may be 
suspended or disbarred. 
Rule 34.13, Rules of Procedure of the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 
Disciplinary Board, provides for a deferral of "further proceedings 
pending the attorney's compliance with conditions imposed by the 
board for supervision of the attorney for a specified period of time not 
to exceed one year unless extended by the board 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however, Rule 203, Kansas 
Supreme Court Rules, Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of 
discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any other 
discipline that the Supreme Court deems appropriate 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 507(a)(1), Idaho Bar Commission Rules, 
provides that suspensions may be withheld in 
whole or in part, contingent upon the defendant's 
observance of specified conditions 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
No identified in rules as sanction but it appears 
that Rule 23 Section 3(c) allows the Court to 
"stay" a suspension and place the attorney on 
probation. If the attorney violates the conditions 
of probation they may be suspended. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
|Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however, 
Rule 203, Kansas Supreme Court Rules, 
Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of 
discipline or conditions separate from or 
connected to any other discipline that the 
[Supreme Court deems appropriate 
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Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Rule 3.380, Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, does not 
specifically provide for probations but rather public reprimands 
and/or suspensions with conditions. The "with conditions" clause 
has been used to probate sanctions. 
Rule XIX, Section 10(A)(3), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, probation should be used only in cases where there is 
little likelihood that the respondent will harm the public during the 
period of rehabilitation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9.121(C), Michigan Court Rules, provides for probation when 
during the subject period the attorney was under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol and the impairment caused or substantially 
contributed to the conduct. Probation must not be contrary to the 
public interest and cannot exceed two years. 
Rule 15(a)(4), Minnesota Rules on Lawyers Professional 
Responsibility, upon conclusion of the proceedings the Court may 
place the lawyer on probationary status for a stated period or until 
further order of the Court, with such conditions as the Court may 
specify and to be supervised by the Director. 
Kuie o(D)(iii), Kuies or Discipline lor me Mississippi btate bar, 
provides for suspensions with or without probation for a fixed period 
nf timp Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the Missouri Bar and the 
Judiciary, lawyer is eligible for probation if he or she is unlikely to 
harm the public during the period of probation and can be adequately 
supervised; lawyer must be able to practice law w/o causing courts 
or profession to fall into disrepute; and cannot have committed an act 
warranting disbarment. Must be imposed for a specified period of 
time and in conjunction with a suspension 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as a sanction, they have 
developed jurisprudential^ 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
* 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
i 
Rule 9.106 Michigan Court Rules allows 
reprimands or suspensions with conditions as the 
hearing panel, the board, or the Supreme Court 
may impose. In practice panels are more likely to 
issue a reprimand with conditions than probation. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the 
Court routinely imposes stayed suspensions, and 
even imposed one stayed disbarment. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the 
Missouri Bar and the Judiciary, Probation 
provides that probations must be imposed in 
conjunction with suspension that may be stayed 
in whole or in part 
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Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Rule 9(C), Montana Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, 
allows lawyer to be placed on probation for such time and conditions 
as are determined to be appropriate. 
Rule 4(A)(3), Nebraska Disciplinary Rules, provides for probation in 
lieu of or subsequent to a suspension. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are routinely imposed by 
agreement and/or contested hearing and are upheld by the Supreme 
Court 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing Discipline, if the 
record discloses that the respondent can still perform legal services 
with proper supervision the Supreme Court may impose probation or 
other conditions as a type of discipline by itself or may defer the 
effect of the sanctions specified in subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, or 4 
(regarding disbarment, suspension, indefinite suspension, or public 
censure). 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
r\uie ^f.o^a;, nuiui udKUid r\uiyb IUI Ldwyui uibupmiu, piuviuus IUI 
probation in cases where there is little likelihood that the attorney will 
harm the public during the supervised period and the conditions of 
Rule V, Section 6.(B)(4), Rules for the Government of the Bar of 
Ohio, probation for a period of time upon conditions as the Supreme 
Court determines, but only in conjunction with a suspension pursuant 
to division (B)(3) of this section. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are 
routinely imposed by agreement and/or contested 
hearing and are upheld by the Supreme Court 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing 
Discipline, provides that the Supreme Court may 
defer the effect of sanctions, including 
suspensions. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
General Statutes of North Carolina section 84-
28(c)(2) allows for suspension for a period of up 
to five years, any portion of which may be stayed. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule V. Section 6. (B)(3) Suspension from the 
practice of law for a period of six months to two 
years subject to a stay in whole or in part 
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Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been 
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Rule 6.2(a), Oregon State Bar Rules of Procedure, upon 
determination that an attorney should be suspended the trial panel 
may stay the suspension in whole or in part and place the attorney 
on probation for a period no longer than three years. 
Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Subchapter G 
section 89.291 repsondent attorney may be placed on probation if 
they have demonstrated that they can perform legal services and will 
not cause the legal profession to fall into disrepute; are unlikely to 
cause harm to the public during the period of probation; the 
necessary conditions of probation can be adequately supervised; 
and are not guilty of acts warranting disbarment. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the Court can and does 
enter disciplinary orders imposing conditions that are tantamount to 
probation 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, 
the imposition of a suspension may be suspended in conjunction 
with a fixed period of probation. Probation shall be used only in 
(cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the 
public during the probationary period and where the conditions of 
probation can be adequately supervised. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can 
and has been ordered by the Court, in its! 
discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Rule 6.1(a)(v), Oregon State Bar Rules of 
Procedure, a suspension for any period in BR 
6.1(a)(iii) or 6.1(a)(iv) which may be stayed in 
whole or in part on the condition that designated 
probationary terms are met 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the 
Court can and does enter disciplinary orders 
imposing conditions that are tantamount to 
stayed suspensions 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules of 
Disciplinary Enforcement, indicates that a 
suspension may be stayed in conjunction with 
fixed period of probation. 
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Texas 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
L Wyoming 
Rule 15.11, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that 
fully probated suspensions shall not be used in cases where the 
respondent received a public reprimand or a fully probated 
suspension within the last five years for violation of the same 
rule/rules; the respondent received two or more fully probated 
suspensions within the last five years; or the respondent received 
two or more public reprimands or greater within the last five years for 
conflict of interest, theft, misapplication of fiduciary property, or the 
failure to return a clearly unearned fee. 
Administrative Order 9, Rule 8(A)(6), Vermont Supreme Court 
Administrative Orders and Rules, Probation may be imposed only in 
conjunction with another sanction, reinstatement from disability, 
reinstatement from disbarment, or suspension. Shall be used only in 
cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the 
public during the probation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
ELC 13.8, Washington Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Discipline, a 
respondent who has been sanctioned under 13.1 (disbarred, 
suspended, or reprimanded) or admonished under 13.5(b) may be 
placed on probation for a fixed period of two years or less. 
Rule 3.15(1), West Virginia Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides 
for probation. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, although the Court 
occasionally imposes "conditions on continued practice." 
Not identified in rules as sanction except as may be appropriate 
under the terms of a diversion contract pursuant to Section 14, 
Wyoming Disciplinary Code 
2.25 and 3.14, Texas Rules of Disciplinary 
Procedure, allow for stayed suspensions. 
Disbarments may not be stayed. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Stayed suspension cannot be longer than five 
years pursuant to Section 4(a)(ii), Wyoming 
Disciplinary Code 
*This chart was prepared in August 2006 based upon information provided to the OPC by its counterparts in other states. 
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